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I. Introduction: The Nature of Purchase Options
A purchase option gives the optionee' the choice of whether or not
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1. The optionee is the one who receives the option, the choice. In a purchase
option, the optionee has the choice of whether to buy or not. He is the prospective
buyer. Colloquially, the optionee is said to "have an option" or to have "taken an op-
tion" on the property. The optionor is the one who grants the option. In a purchase
option, the optionor is the prospective seller. As this article considers only purchase
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to purchase property at certain terms. This article will focus upon op-
tions to purchase real property, examining their applications, their ben-
efits and their limitations to gain an understanding of options in per-
spective. Then the author will provide suggestions for the productive
use of this device while eliminating the wasteful litigation which is pro-
duced by the current state of the law.
A purchase option is an offer to enter a particular contract to sell
which has been made irrevocable. Two contracts are involved. The first,
often referred to as an "option contract,"2 is a unilateral contracts
which binds the offeror to hold open the offer to enter the second con-
tract, a contract to sell the land. This type of purchase option should be
distinguished from options created by will, testamentary options, which
are governed by the law of wills rather than contract law."
Traditional contract rules govern the option contracts.5 The op-
options, that is the way in which the parties will be referred to throughout. Note, how-
ever, that options may be used in various other ways. In other types of options the
labels optionor and optionee may fall on the parties differently. For example, if the
option gave the seller the choice of whether the buyer would be required to buy, i.e. a
sale option, the seller would be the optionee.
2. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 25 (1981) comment (a) states:
"Option" A promise which constitutes an option contract may be con-
tained in the offer itself, or it may be made separately in a collateral offer
to keep the main offer open. Such promises are commonly called "op-
tions." But the word "option" is also often used for any continuing offer,
even though revocable, and indeed is sometimes used to refer to any power
to make a choice. To avoid ambiguity the phrase 'option contract' is used
in this Restatement.
3. State v. New Jersey Zinc Co., 40 N.J. 560, 576, 193 A.2d 244, 252 (1963).
4. A testamentary option is a term in a will which gives the beneficiary the right
to purchase certain property at a specified price, or a price to be determined according
to a method specified by the will. Testamentary options are used primarily by testators
who are trying to equalize shares in their estates. This type of option resembles a right
of first refusal because, like a right of first refusal, it does not ripen into an exercisable
option until the occurrence of a condition precedent. A purchase option contract may
be conditioned upon the death of a party, but a testamentary option is subject to a
condition precedent that the testator will die without having revoked the will in which
the option appears. The testamentary option is a right given to the beneficiary by the
will, not by contract as are the purchases discussed in this article. See Annotation,
Option Created By Will To Purchase Real Estate, 44 A.L.R.2d 1214 (1955); Annota-
tion, Determination Of Price Under Testamentary Option To Buy Real Estate, 13
A.L.R.4th 947 (1982); Annotation, Time In Which Option Created By Will To
Purchase Real Estate Is To Be Exercised, 82 A.L.R.3d 790 (1978).
5. Because of the local nature of real estate contracts, it is imperative that the
law of the jurisdiction be carefully examined for local idiosyncracies. See, e.g., 1 FLOR-
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tionor must receive consideration to make the option contract binding
and the offer to enter the second contract irrevocable. The lack of es-
sential terms would be fatal. However, it need not specify all the de-
tails of the purchase contract. Some omissions may be filled in by a
court assuming the parties intended to use reasonable terms.8
When exercised, an option to purchase real property will ripen into
a contract for the purchase of real property. The Statute of Frauds
provides that a contract for real property must be in writing and signed
by the party to be charged. Some jurisdictions apply this writing re-
quirement to purchase options.' However, an option is not technically a
contract for an interest in real estate, but a contract to hold open an
IDA REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS, Ch. 6B, Option Contracts.
6. See discussion of consideration infra in section V.
7. Essential terms would include the price, see Annotation, Requisite Definite-
ness Of Price To Be Paid In Event Of Exercise Of Option For Purchase of Property, 2
A.L.R.3d 701 (1965) and Annotation, Specific Performance Of Contract Or Option As
Affected By Unexecuted Provision For Determination Of Price By Arbitrators Or Ap-
praisers, 167 A.L.R. 727 (1947); the time within which the performance must occur,
see Annotation, Validity Of Option To Purchase Realty As Affected By Indefiniteness
Of Term Provided For Exercise, 31 A.L.R.3d 522 (1970); and a description of the
land, but a street address has been held sufficient. Park West Village, Inc. v. Avise, 714
P.2d 1137 (Utah 1986).
8. See, e.g., Detwiler v. Capone, 357 Pa. 495, 55 A.2d 380 (1947) (The court
determined that, absent any specific terms to the contrary, an option in a lease could be
exercised at any time during the term of the lease and that the kind of deed to be used,
when and where the payment was to be made, and the purchase money mortgage terms
were to be the usual reasonable forms and terms.) See Annotation, Validity Of Option
To Purchase Realty As Affected By Indefiniteness Of Term Provided For Exercise, 31
A.L.R.3d 522 (1970).
9. See, e.g., Montanaro Bros. Builders, Inc. v. Snow, 190 Conn. 481, 460 A.2d
1297 (1983) (holding that Connecticut's Statute of Frauds does apply to options); Foy
v. Foy, 484 So. 2d 439 (Ala. 1986) (holding that the failure to express a consideration
would violate the Alabama Statute of Frauds). However, the courts seem willing to go
to lengths to find the existence of a sufficient writing. See also, South Florida Citrus
Land Co. v. Walden, 59 Fla. 606, 51 So. 554 (1910) (finding a writing sufficient that
described the property "all of the land owned by said [defendant] located west and
north of the South fork of the Miami river..."); Williams v. Williams, 347 N.W.2d
893 (S.D. 1984) (holding that the presence of the right of first refusal in a prior lease,
the reference to it in an unexecuted memorandum of extension of the lease and in the
lessor's listing agreement were sufficient); Baker v. Jellibeans, 252 Ga. 458, 314 S.E.2d
872 (1984) (holding that despite an integration clause in the option, the writing re-
quirement could be satisfied by reference to documents involving the sale of other lots
as part of the same transactions); Broach v. City of Hamilton, 283 Ark. 496, 677
S.W.2d 851 (1984) (holding the grantee's acceptance and recording of the deed con-
taining the repurchase option satisfied the requirements).
1987]
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offer to enter a real estate contract. As a result of this distinction, the
Statute of Frauds is not applied to purchase options in every state.1"
Violating the Statute of Frauds would prevent the optionee from forc-
ing the sale of the land to him and it might also prevent him from
recovering what he paid for the optionee, depending: on whether the
state's version of the statute makes such contracts void or unenforce-
able. As illustrated by Braunger v. Snow," if the option is void, the
optionee would be entitled to the return of the consideration paid for it,
but he would not if the option was merely unenforceable because he
had received what he paid for even if he had no remedy to enforce it.
If the option is not exercised, no contract of sale exists. When the
specified period of the option ends, the unexercised option expires and
the optionee no longer has the power to accept the offer. The optionee
is not entitled to the return of the consideration paid for an expired
option because he has received what he paid for, the option. 2
If the option is exercised, the offer to sell has been accepted and a
contract formed. Subsequently, the terms of that contract of sale deter-
mine the rights and remedies of the parties. 3 The language of the op-
tion will be the primary source in determining those terms, including
exactly what property is being purchased."' Ambiguities in the contract
create questions to be resolved by traditional rules of interpretation.",
10. W.M., R.W., & T.R. Bowler, a Partnership v. TMG Partnership, 357
N.W.2d 109 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).
II. 405 N.W.2d 643 (S.D. 1987).
12. Chubb v. J. Harker Chadwick & Co., 93 Fla. 114, 111 So. 538 (1927).
(Where the option provided for installment payments and further provided that upon a
default in any payment the option would be extinguished and the prior payments re-
tained as consideration for the option, the court held that the optionor was not required
to return the payments upon terminating the option.)
13. See Annotation, Tenant's Right To Damages For Landlord's Breach Of
Tenant's Option To Purchase, 17 A.L.R.3d 976 (1968); Annotation, Option To
Purchase Real Property As Affected By Optionor's Receipt Of Offer For, Or Sale Of,
Larger Tract Which Includes The Optioned Parcel, 34 A.L.R.4th 1217 (1984).
14. See, e.g., Robbinson v. Central Properties, Inc., 468 So. 2d 986 (Fla. 1985),
where the clear and unambiguous language of the right of first refusal extended only to
the sale of a water and sewer system and, therefore, did not include a right of first
refusal to acquire the stock in the corporation which owned the water and sewer sys-
tem. The court pointed out that "[iun construing contracts, the intention of the parties
governs, and the intention will be determined from the language when it is
unambiguous."
15. See, e.g., S.B.R.'s Restaurant, Ltd. v. Towey, 515 N.Y.S.2d 573 (1987),
where the ambiguity whether the tenant had a right of first refusal for the purchase of
the entire building or only for the portion of the building occupied by their restaurant
[Vol. 12
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It is sometimes difficult to distinguish between an option and a
contract of sale which is subject to conditions. 6 The determination re-
quires careful examination of the terms. The critical factor is whether
the parties intended that the potential buyer be obligated to purchase,
producing a contract of sale, or have the choice whether to purchase or
not, producing an option. An optionee has a free choice to purchase, or
not, because he has not yet accepted the seller's offer to sell." In con-
trast, if the buyer is obligated to purchase, but may be relieved of that
obligation by the failure of a condition, the agreement is a contract of
sale, not an option.
An example was provided when the Florida Supreme Court con-
sidered a written agreement which began, "Received of R.H. Dough-
erty the sum of $1000.00 for an option to purchase upon the following
terms and conditions. . .."' The agreement provided that the initial
deposit was to become part of the purchase money if the purchase was
completed, that the deposit would be returned if the seller were unable
to produce a merchantable title, and the deposit would be forfeited to
the seller if the buyer did not perform. The court concluded it was
really a contract of sale and not an option because the buyer was obli-
gated to purchase unless the seller failed to satisfy the title condition. If
the buyer failed to purchase as obligated, the buyer would, in effect, be
liable for breach, the loss of his deposit being the equivalent of liqui-
dated damages.19
In contrast, an agreement which appeared to be a sales contract
but provided that "[i]f the present owner does not approve of the terms
of this contract, or other terms agreeable to both parties, . . ." was an
option to purchase rather than an executed contract of sale.2 0 The pre-
created a question of fact as to the parties intent.
16. See, e.g., Ellis and Abramowitz, Contracts as Commodities: Issues and Ap-
proaches in Regard to Commercial Real Estate "Earnest Money" and "Option" Con-
tracts-A Texas Lawyer's Perspective, 16 ST. MARY'S L.J. 541, 546-555 (1985) (the
authors distinguish the two under Texas law.)
17. Acheson v. Smiths, Inc., I10 Fla. 240, 148 So. 576 (1933).
18. Wolfle v. Daugherty, 103 Fla. 432, 137 So. 717 (1931).
19. Consequently, the court concluded that on the failure of the condition due to
title problems, the buyer was entitled to recover the money paid and to an equitable
vendee's lien on the land for that amount. If the agreement had been a option, then the
prospective vendee would not have been entitled to either the return of his money or an
equitable lien for the amount paid because he would have received what he paid for, an
option.
20. Pick v. Adams, 98 Fla. 140, 123 So. 547 (1929).
1987]
Nova Law Review
sent owner had the free choice whether to approve, that is, accept or
not. He was not obligated to perform. Consequently, the agreement was
a purchase option and not a contract of sale.
The parties to a contract of sale may agree to limit the remedies in
the event of a breach. Some sales contracts specify that the seller
would be limited to liquidated damages, usually the amount of the de-
posit, and prohibited from obtaining specific performance. 1 Because
the buyer has the choice of completing the purchase or losing his de-
posit, it is very similar to an option and some courts may conclude that
it is in fact, if not in appearance, an option. 2 The buyer has, for the
price of his deposit, purchased the right to go through with the
purchase or not without further liability. 3
21. There seem to be two incentives for the use of such contracts. The first is
availability. Form contracts of sale are readily available to the parties and to real estate
brokers. Mass produced option forms seem to be a comparative rarity. Consequently,
the parties may try to modify a readily available form to reflect their agreement rather
than drafting an entirely new agreement or searching for a more nearly appropriate
form.
The other incentive for the use of these contracts may be found in the law gov-
erning mortgages. The seller's property may be subject to a mortgage that contains a
due-on-sale clause which allows the mortgagee to accelerate the debt, calling the mort-
gage debt due immediately. The seller does not want the mortgagee to do this simply
because he has given an option on the property. Whether the mortgagee can do so
generally depends on the terms of the mortgage, but under the Garn-St.Germain Act,
most lenders cannot invoke the due-on-sale clause if the property is leased for less than
three years or the lease does not include an option to purchase. See generally GARN-
ST.GERMAIN DEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONS ACT OF 1982, Pub. L. 97-320, 12 U.S.C.A. §
1701j-3. The exemptions are found at § 341(d) and discussion thereof in NELSON AND
WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW (2d Ed. 1985).
An optionee under a lease which includes an option is not protected by the act. So
rather than give a lease with an option to purchase, the seller may enter into a
purchase contract with the lessee which calls for closing within the term of the lease
(usually one or two years) on thirty days notice from the buyer. Should the buyer fail
to close within the term of the lease, he would simply forfeit his purchase deposit. The
efficacy of this method of circumventing the due-on-sale clause is dubious but no re-
ported cases on the issue have been discovered. However, on the issue of concealment
of events which might trigger the due-on-sale clause, see id.
22. See Ellis and Abramowitz, Contracts as Commodities: Issues and Ap-
proaches in Regard to Commercial Real Estate "Earnest Money" and "Option" Con-
tracts-A Texas Lawyer's Perspective, 16 ST. MARY'S L.J. 541, 546-555 (1985), where
the authors conclude that the Texas rule is to treat such purchase contracts as options.
23. It was suggested that the converse, an option to sell, might be an illusory
contract in Clone, Inc. v. Orr, 476 So. 2d 1300 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1985), where
the court concluded that a contract that limited the buyer's damages to recovery of the
[Vol. 12
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The characterization as a contract of sale rather than an option
may affect the rights2 and remedies25 available to the parties. The doc-
trine of equitable conversion which shifts the risks of loss to the buyer
under a sales contract is inapplicable to options so the optionee does not
get an equitable interest in the land as would the buyer under a sales
contract.2 6 Because the optionee has no interest in the land, the op-
tionee may not be entitled to compensation in the event it is taken by a
governmental body using its eminent domain powers.27
deposit from the breaching seller would be nothing more that an "option to sell." How-
ever, the court avoided discussing that possibility by focusing on other language in the
default clause, concluding that the parties intended an enforceable contract so the de-
fault term could not be read to limit the buyer remedies to return of the deposit.
24. See e.g., if the optionors are joint tenants or tenants by the entirety, entering
a contract of sale may be found a sufficient manifestation of intent to sever the unities
and, consequently, sever the tenancy into a tenancy in common. It is far less likely that
such severance would occur based upon the granting of an option, however, the possi-
bility should be considered by the joint options. See Annotation, Contract of Sale or
Granting of Option to Purchase, To Third Party, by Both or All of Joint Tenants or
Tenants by Entirety as Severing or Terminating Tenancy, 39 A.L.R.4th 1068 (1985).
As with a contract of sale, an option given by a landowner prior to marriage would not
be subject to the subsequent wife's dower interest. Detwiler v. Capone, 357 Pa. 495, 55
A.2d 380 (1947).
25. The characterization could be critical in a state that requires a defaulted
installment contract to be judicially foreclosed like a mortgage. See, e.g., Boyd v.
Watts, 342 S.E.2d 840 (N.C. 1986).
26. The doctrine of equitable conversion is based on the equitable maxim "equity
considers done what ought to be done." In a sales contract, the seller ought to convey,
so equity treats the parties as if he had, vesting equitable title in the buyer. An option,
however, does not obligate the seller to convey until the buyer exercises the option
which he might never do. Whitson Co. v. Bluff Creek Oil Co., 278 S.W.2d 339, 342
(Tex. Civ. App. 1955), affid, 156 Tex. 139, 293 S.W.2d 488 (1956). See generally
BOYER, SURVEY OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY 375-380 (3d ed. 1981); CUNNINGHAM,
STOEBUCK AND WHITMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY, §10.13 (19 ). See also Annotation,
Equitable Conversion Doctrine As Applicable To Option To Purchase Land, In The
Event Of Death Of Optionor Or Optionee Before Its Exercise, 172 A.L.R. 438 (1948).
27. East Bay Mun. Util. Dist. v. Kieffer, 99 Cal. App. 240, 278 P. 476 (1929);
Cravero v. Florida State Turnpike Authority, 91 So. 2d 312 (Fla. 1956); Phillips Petro-
leum Co. v. City of Omaha, 171 Neb. 457, 106 N.W.2d 727 (1960); Haney v. Denny,
135 Ind. App. 317, 193 N.E.2d 648 (1963). Contra In re Governor Mifflin Joint School
Authority, 401 Pa. 387, 164 A.2d 221 (1960).
Whether the optionee's title, after exercising the option, relates back for certain
purposes to the execution of the option presents an interesting question. See Shaffer v.
Flick, 360 Pa. Super. 192, 520 A.2d 50 (1987); Newport Waterworks v. Sisson, 18 R.I.
411, 28 A. 336 (1893) and Mueller v. Nortmann, 116 Wis. 468, 93 N.W. 538 (1903)
which hold it does relate back. Contra Sheeby v. Scott, 128 Iowa 551, 104 N.W. 1139
1987]
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The characterization as an option rather than as a contract of sale
may also have effect on rights regarding the money paid. The tax treat-
ment may depend on whether it is part of the purchase price of the
property or the consideration for the option.2 8 In addition, the question
of whether an agreement is a contract for sale or an option may deter-
mine whether a commission is due to any real estate broker involved
and, if so, when. Unless the brokerage contract provides otherwise,29 a
broker is not entitled to a commission for procuring a person who takes
an option on the property unless and until the optionee exercises the
option a° or the optionor prevents the optionee from exercising it.31
II. Creating a Purchase Option
The purchase option contract must be created in accord with the
requirements of contract formation. Generally, there must be an offer
to enter the option contract, an acceptance of that offer and considera-
(1905); Rockland-Rockport Lime Co. v. Leary, 203 N.Y. 469, 97 N.E. 43 (1911);
Smith v. Lowenstein, 50 Ohio 346, 34 N.E. 159 (1923); In re Bisbee's Estate, 177 Wis.
77, 187 N.W. 653 (1922). See also Annotation, Right To Damages Or Compensation
Upon Condemnation Of Property, Of Holder Of Unexercised Option to Purchase, 85
A.L.R.2d 588 (1962).
28. See SAMANSKY AND SMITH, FEDERAL TAXATION OF REAL ESTATE § 7.01[5].
The rules regarding the treatment of payment for an option may affect when the in-
come is recognized and whether the income from an unexercised option may be capital
or ordinary and whether the cost of an unexercised option may be a loss and if so
whether capital or ordinary.
29. Ordinarily a broker is entitled to a commission for procuring a potential
buyer who is ready, willing and able to purchase the property on the terms listed. A
potential buyer who only wants to take an option is not necessarily "willing" to buy
according to those terms. St. Petersburg Land & Loan Co. v. Shallcross, 84 Fla. 575,
94 So. 502 (1922); Acheson v. Smiths, Inc., 110 Fla. 240, 148 So. 576 (1933). How-
ever, under the terms of the brokerage agreement, the seller may be liable for a com-
mission if the broker provides an optionee or even if the seller removes the property
from the market during the term of the listing. In Ratner v. Coral Television Corpora-
tion, 139 So. 2d 437 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1962), the agreement provided that the
optionee-buyer would pay the broker's commission in the event that the option was not
exercised. The court held that the broker was entitled to his commission when the
option time passed even though the option was extended because the broker was not a
party to the extension nor had he consented to it. See generally Annotation, Broker's
Right to Commission from Principal upon Procuring Third Party Taking an Option,
32 A.L.R.3d 331 (1970).
30. Marathon Realty Corp. v. Gavin, 224 Neb. 458, 398 N.W.2d 689 (1987).
31. DaLee Realty, Inc. v. Kuhl, 209 Neb. 6, 305 N.W.2d 891 (1981).
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tion for the option.32
Either the prospective optionor or the prospective optionee could
make the offer to enter the option contract. The Restatement (Second)
of Contracts defines an offer as:
An offer is the manifestation of willingness to enter into a bargain,
so made as to justify another person in understanding that his as-
sent to that bargain is invited and will conclude it.33
The offer must manifest the willingness to enter into the option.34 An
offer which is not sufficiently definite would, even if accepted, lead only
to an illusory contract, that is, an agreement to agree. 35 Consequently,
a landowner's statement to some of his tenants that "when he decided
to sell, if the price were right and could be agreed on, and if conditions
were right, and he was ready to sell, he would give the tenant a chance,
or a first chance to buy" was not sufficient to create an option.3 6 The
landowner never manifested an intent to give the tenants the choice of
whether to accept or not because he never had such an intent. He re-
tained the power to decide when to sell, to whom he would sell and on
what terms.37
An acceptance is a manifestation that the offeree agrees to the
32. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 25 (1981). "Option Con-
tracts. An option contract is a promise which meets the requirements for the formation
of a contract and limits the promisor's power to revoke an offer."
Concerning an option, the Restatement goes on to specify that:
"(1) An offer is binding as an option contract if it
(a) is in writing and signed by the offeror, recites a purported consideration for the
making of the offer, and proposes an exchange on fair terms within a reasonable time;
or
(b) is made irrevocable by statute."
Note, however, that the requirement of a writing even for an option to purchase real
estate, is far from unanimous. See supra text accompanying notes 9-10.
33. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 24 (1981).
34. Thus, a prospective buyer's belief that he had a first option to purchase the
property according to the terms of the vendor's counteroffer, pending his decision
whether or not to accept, was mistaken because, inter alia, the vendor had not made an
offer to hold that counteroffer open. Normile v. Miller, 313 N.C. 98, 326 S.E.2d 11
(1985).
35. Christmas v. Turkin, 148 Ariz. App. 602, 716 P.2d 59 (1986); Weitzman v.
Steinberg, 638 S.W. 171 (Tex. App. 1982).
36. Hood v. Hawkins, 478 A.2d 181, 184 (R.I. 1984).
37. Id. The court, however, does not use the term offer, but speaks instead in
terms of granting a power to accept.
1987]
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offered terms, 38 the point being to establish that there is a meeting of
the minds of the parties.39 Whether acceptance is to be manifested by a
promise or by performance or both depends on the terms of the offer., 0
However, if the offer does not limit the means of acceptance, then it
can be by any reasonable means and through any reasonable medium."'
This acceptance of the offer to enter an option is to be distinguished
from the exercise of the option"2 which is the acceptance of the irrevo-
cable offer to enter the second contract, the contract of sale. An offer of
an option which lacks critical details cannot be accepted because there
is no meeting of the minds as to the details of the contract of sale
which would arise if the option were accepted."'
Consideration is needed to make the option contract binding and
the offer to enter into the sales contract irrevocable." Absent consider-
ation, the offer is revocable at any time before it has been accepted."' It
is not necessary to have separate consideration for an option which is
part of a larger transaction for which the optionee has given considera-
tion, such as a contract of sale with an option to purchase additional
land,46 a lease,4 7 or a repurchase option in a deed.48
38. Hoover Community Hotel Corp. v. Thomson, 167 Cal. App. 3d 1130, 213
Cal. Rptr. 750, (1985); Madison v. Marlatt, 619 P.2d 708 (Wyo. 1980); Jones v.
Nunley, 547 P.2d 616 (Ore. 1976). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §
50(1) (1981).
39. Bucciero v. Drinkwater, 13 Mass. App. 551, 434 N.E.2d 1315 (1982). Ac-
cordingly, the lack of essential elements would render an option invalid. Reynolds v.
Sullivan, 136 Vt. 1, 383 A.2d 609 (1978); Rolfs v. Mason, 202 Va. 690, 119 S.E.2d
238 (1961); Bonk v. Boyajian, 128 Cal. App. 2d 153, 274 P.2d 948 (1954).
40. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 30(1) and 50(2) (1981).
41. See id. § 30(2) (1981).
42. Discussed infra section 111.
43. Goodman v. Goodman, 290 So. 2d 552 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1973).
44. Behrman v. Max, 102 Fla. 1093, 137 So. 120 (1931); Donahue v. Davis, 68
So. 2d 163, 170 (1953); Carter Oil Co. v. Owen, 27 F. Supp. 74 (E.D. I11. 1939). See
also Foy v. Foy, 484 So. 2d 439 (Ala. 1986); The Restatement, Contracts, Second § 25
defines option contract as "a promise which meets the requirements for the formation
of a contract and limits the promisor's power to revoke an offer." Comment d to this
section of the Restatement points out that "[a] revocation by the offeror is not of itself
effective, and the offer is properly referred to as an irrevocable offer."
45. Accordingly, an option not supported by consideration would be revoked at
the optionor's death even though it was expressly intended to be exercised against the
optionor's estate after the optionor's death. Crowley v. Bass, 445 So. 2d 902 (Ala.
1984). See also Normile v. Miller, 313 N.C. 98, 326 S.E.2d 11 (1985).
46. O'Brien v. R-J Development Corp., 387 N.W.2d 521 (S.D. 1986); Brooks v.
Terteling, 107 Idaho 262, 688 P.2d 1167 (1984). See also Baker v. Jellibeans, Inc., 252
[Vol. 12
Real Estate Purchase Options
However, a minimal consideration may be enough. In an extreme
case, the buyers had entered into a written agreement which acknowl-
edged the receipt of $1000 towards the purchase price of a certain con-
dominium which was then under construction. The agreement provided
that the buyer had the right to purchase at a specified price and that,
upon completion of the unit, the purchaser would be given notice and
furnished with a purchase contract. The purchaser would then have
fourteen days to decide whether to sign the contract or to cancel and
have the deposit returned with interest. When the seller unilaterally
decided that the price was going to be raised, the buyer sued for breach
of the contract. The appeals court decided that if a jury found that the
buyer has suffered some detriment and inconvenience in being deprived
of the use of the money during the time when it was held on deposit or
determined that the seller had derived a benefit in being able to use the
option agreements as a vehicle for further promotion of other sales, for
example, inducing others to buy, then the option would not fail for lack
of consideration. 9 That the option had been acquired for minimal or
even nominal consideration would not serve to make the option ineffec-
tive and the offer revocable.5 0
Historically, an offer could also be made irrevocable by being
under seal. 51 Some states now consider a seal to have the effect of
merely raising a rebuttable presumption that there was consideration. 52
Ga. 458, 314 S.E.2d 874 (1984) (an option to purchase one lot given as part of a
transaction involving the sale of three lots, would not require separate consideration).
47. Hennessey v. Price, 96 Nev. 33, 604 P.2d 355 (1980).
48. Wells v. Gootrad, 112 Idaho 912, 736 P.2d 1366 (1987).
49. Benson v. Chalfonte Dev. Corp., 348 So. 2d 557 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1976).
50. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 87, comment b (1981). "Nominal
Consideration: Offers made in consideration of one dollar paid or promised are often
irrevocable. . . .[C]ourts do not ordinarily inquire into the adequacy of the considera-
tion bargained for." See also Crawford v. Deshotels, 359 So. 2d 118 (La. 1978) (a
nonlawyer optionee's preparing and obtaining quitclaim deeds needed to perfect the
optionor's title was sufficient consideration for the purchase option); Carter Oil Co. v.
Owen, 27 F. Supp. 74 (E.D. III. 1939) (an implied obligation that lessee will develop
oil fields would be sufficient consideration).
51. Carter Oil Co. v. Owen, 27 F. Supp. 74 (E.D. Ill. 1939). See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) CONTRACTS § 25 (1981) comment (c). "Types of Option Contracts: The
traditional common-law devices for making an offer irrevocable are the giving of con-
sideration and the affixing of a seal." Id. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CON-
TRACTS § 95 (1981).
52. See, e.g., Scoville v. Scoville, 40 So. 2d 840 (Fla. 1949) which concerned a
sealed deed; McGill v. Henderson, 98 So. 2d 791 (Fla. 1957) which concerned a release
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The use of a seal will probably soon be universally considered to be an
anachronism53 and an option under seal, 4 prior to acceptance, merely a
revocable offer, if the optionor could show the lack of consideration.
Even absent consideration, an option may be enforced based on
promissory estoppel. According to the Restatement,
(2) An offer which the offeror should reasonably expect to induce
action or forbearance of a substantial character on the part of the
offeree before acceptance and which does induce such action or for-
bearance is binding as an option contract to the extent necessary to
avoid injustice.55
Divisible option contracts may present a special problem. The Re-
statement refers to a contract which is produced by "[a]n offer contem-
plating a series of independent contracts by separate acceptances ' 5 6
and states the rule that they "may be effectively revoked so as to termi-
nate the power to create future contracts, although one or more of the
proposed contracts have already been formed by the offeree's accept-
ance." However the Drafter's Comment points out that:
It is possible to make a divisible offer irrevocable, not just as to the
contracts already formed by acceptances, but also as to the power
to create future contracts. An irrevocable divisible offer is in effect
a series of binding option contracts, but all may be made binding
by a single consideration or a single formal document.5 7
under seal.
53. See UNIFORM LAND TRANSACTIONS ACT § 1-307, (1977), which, if adopted
by a state legislature, would eliminate the use of seals and sealed instruments in real
estate transactions such as options.
54. However, until the total disappearance of the seal, it is necessary to be alert
since modern permutations may be considered a seal. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 695.07
(1985), which provides that "[a] scrawl or scroll, printed or written, affixed as a seal to
any written instrument shall be effectual as a seal."
55. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 87 (1981).
56. Id. § 47 (1981).
57. Id. comment c (1981). See Osborn v. H.D.H., Inc., 192 So. 2d 22 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 1966) (The buyer was purchasing 46 lots and the agreement gave him
the option to purchase an additional 54 lots the following year and 100 lots each year
thereafter until a total of 420 lots had been purchased. When a problem in interpreting
the options arose, the court held that the agreements were separate and distinct ar-
rangements for the purchase and sale of additional lots.)
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An offer can only be accepted while it is still on the table."8 If the
offer is withdrawn or otherwise terminated prior to acceptance, no con-
tract of sale is created.58 Similarly, an attempt to exercise an option
after it has expired would be ineffective because, having failed to pro-
duce a meeting of the minds, no contract of sale is produced. 60
Ordinarily an offer is revoked by the death of either the offeror or
the offeree, but an option is an irrevocable offer and, consequently, it is
not ordinarily revoked by death."' Moreover, an option is not termi-
nated by the optionee's offering to purchase on other terms or refusing
to exercise the option prior to expiration. The Restatement (Second) of
Contracts summarizes:
. . . the power of acceptance under an option contract is not termi-
58. Of course, it can be extended by agreement or the optionor can waive the
expiration. See Ratner v. Coral Television Corp., 139 So. 2d 437 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct
App. 1962).
59. Foy v. Foy, 484 So. 2d 439 (Ala. 1986). See also Echols v. Bloom, 485
S.W.2d 798 (Tex. Ct. App. 1972) (The court first concluded that a purported earnest
money contract was in fact an option and then concluded that the option was not sup-
ported by consideration since the earnest money had not actually been deposited until
after the option/offer had been withdrawn.)
60. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 63, comment f (1981).
. . . Option contracts are commonly subject to a definite time limit, and
the usual understanding is that the notification that the option has been
exercised must be received by the offeror before that time. Whether or not
there is such a time limit, in the absence of a contrary provision in the
option contract, the offeree takes the risk of loss or delay in the transmis-
sion of the acceptance and remains free to revoke the acceptance until it
arrives. Similarly, if there is such a mistake on the part of the offeror as
justifies the rescission of his unilateral obligation, the right to rescind is not
lost merely because a letter of acceptance is posted.
61. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 48 (1981). "Death or Inca-
pacity of Offeror or Offeree. An Offeree's power of acceptance is terminated when the
offeree or offeror dies or is deprived of legal capacity to enter into the proposed con-
tract." Id. However Comment d to this section points out that: "[t]he rule stated in this
section does not affect option contracts. . . . But the death or incapacity of one of the
parties may discharge any contractual duty by reason of failure of consideration, frus-
tration, impossibility or failure of condition." But see Fisher v. Fisher, 23 Mass. App.
Ct. 205, 500 N.E.2d 821 (1986) (a right of first refusal was terminated by the deaths
of the optionees due to its reference to the optionees by personal terms and the lack of
suitable terms, such as heirs and assigns, to indicate the right was intended to survive
their deaths); Brauer v. Hobbs, 151 Mich. App. 769, 391 N.W.2d 482 (1986) (a right
of first refusal, exercisable if the vendor was ready to sell, would be terminated by her
death).
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nated by rejection or counter-offer, by revocation, or by death or
incapacity of the offeror, unless the requirements are met for the
discharge of a contractual duty.62
III. Exercising a Purchase Option
Exercising a purchase option is the equivalent of accepting an offer
to enter into a bilateral purchase contract.63 Whether there has been
such an acceptance as to create a binding contract is determined by
normal rules of contract formation." Generally, that involves notifying
the optionor that the option has been exercised, 65 but the parties could
agree to a method of exercising the option that requires something
other than, or more than, notification. For example, the option may
specify that to exercise the option requires making a payment of part
or all of the purchase price" or the payment of a mortgage. 67
As the Georgia Supreme Court pointed out, "[b]ecause of the sin-
gular one-sidedness of an option contract in creating, for a stated dura-
tion, an irrevocable offer of the optionor, the law requires that the op-
tionee perform all of its obligations under the contract with particular
timeliness."" Accordingly, time is considered to be of the essence in
exercising an option even if that is not expressed.6 9 The logic behind
62. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 37 (1981).
63. Cochran v. Taylor, 273 N.Y. 172, 184, 7 N.E.2d 89, 93 (1937).
64. Goodman v. Goodman, 290 So. 2d 552 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1973).
65. Orlando Realty Board Bldg. Corporation v. Hilpert, 113 So. 100 (Fla. 1927).
MacArthur v. North Palm Beach Utilities, Inc., 202 So. 2d 181, 185 (Fla. 1967) (A
letter notifying the optionor that it is the formal notice that the option is being exer-
cised was held sufficient.)
66. See, e.g., Romain v. A. Howard Wholesale Company, 506 N.E.2d 1124 (Ind.
App. 1987). See also TST Ltd., Inc. v. Houston, 256 Ga. 679, 353 S.E.2d 26 (1987)
(The option was to be exercised by concluding the transfer, i.e., closing and paying the
purchase price, after giving five days written notice to the optionor.)
67. August Tobler, Inc. v. Goolsby, 67 So. 2d 537 (Fla. 1953) (The seller took
back a purchase money mortgage which included the option to buy certain surrounding
land but expressly conditioned upon the payment of the mortgage debt. When the
mortgage went into default, the option was terminated.)
68. TST, supra n.66, 256 Ga. at 680, 353 S.E.2d at 27, quoting from Barkley-
Cupit Enterprises, Inc. v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the United States, 157 Ga.
App. 138, 141, 276 S.E.2d 650, 654 (1981).
69. Howard Cole & Co., Inc. v. Williams, 27 So. 2d 352, 356 (Fla. 1946); So-
cony-Vacuum Oil Co. v. Pabian, 32 N.J. Super. 390, 396, 108 A. 2d 503, 505 (Ch.
Div. 1954). See Annotation, Timeliness Of Notice Of Exercise Of Option To Purchase
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this is that "[w]hen the time expires, the option holder has received the
full agreed equivalent of the price he paid for his option. ' " So the
optionee who fails to exercise the option in time is not losing or forfeit-
ing anything because its contract rights terminated by their own
terms.7' However, any requirements may be voluntarily or accidentally
waived by the optionee.7 1 In addition, an optionee is considered to exer-
cise the option by filing suit to enforce it.73
An acceptance must match the terms of the offer. Any variation of
the terms would reduce the communication to a counter offer. Accord-
ingly, the rule for exercising an option to purchase has been expressed
as follows:
[T]o exercise the option to purchase under an option contract, thus
imposing a duty on the vendor to convey the land in accordance
with the terms and conditions provided therein, the vendee must
strictly comply with the applicable provisions of the contract. It is
necessary that the optionee accept the terms of the option
unqualifiedly. ..7
Realty, 87 A.L.R.3d 805 (1978); Annotation, Time Specified In Real-Estate Contract
For Giving Notice Of Exercise Of Option To Purchase As Of Essence, 72 A.L.R.2d
1127 (1960). But see Tarlo v. Robinson, 118 A.D.2d 561, 499 N.Y.S.2d 174 (App.
Div. 1986); S.B.R.'s Restaurant, Ltd. v. Towey, 130 A.D. 2d 645, 515 N.Y.S.2d 573
(1987).
In contrast, time may not be of the essence in the performance of other obliga-
tions. See. e.g., Davis v. Moseley, 155 So. 2d 884 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1963) (obli-
gation to accept title under repurchase 'option prior to receiving the showing that title
was unencumbered); Cox v. Bellamy, 93 So. 2d 64 (Fla. 1957) (obligation to bring suit
to quiet title).
70. Romain, supra n.66, 506 N.E.2d at 1127 citing I A CORBIN, A COMPREHEN-
SIVE TREATISE ON THE WORKING RULES OF CONTRACT LAW § 273 (1963).
71. TST, supra n.66, 256 Ga. at 80, 353 S.E.2d at 27.
72. See, e.g., Siders v. Odak, 126 A.D. 2d 292, 513 N.Y.S. 2d 549 (App. Div.
1987) (The requirement of written notification was verbally waived by the optionor.)
See also TST, supra n.66 256 Ga. at 680, 253 S.E.2d at 27 (No waiver was found
because of the failure to allege the elements of waiver, i.e., acts or statements from
which the intent to waive could reasonably be inferred.)
73. But a suit to specifically enforce a sales contract in which the buyer also
acquired options to purchase additional lots would not have the effect of exercising the
additional options. The buyers, who were successful in their action for specific perform-
ance, would be able to exercise those options in the future. O'Brien v. R-J Development
Corp., 387 N.W.2d 521 (S.D. 1981), modified on rehg at 398 N.W.2d 132 (S.D.
1986), but note the dissent of Justice Henderson, at 134.
74. Mathews v. Kingsley, 100 So. 2d 445, 446 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1958)
(citation omitted) (The buyers had attempted to exercise the option but also sought to
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In discussing options, the Restatement expresses the same sentiment.
"The offeror's duty of performance under any option contract so cre-
ated is conditioned on completion or tender of the invited performance
in accordance with the terms of the offer." 75However, that is not meant
to indicate that an optionor may seize upon the slightest discrepancy to
avoid his obligations under the option. A notice will still be effective
even if it varies from the terms of the option if the optionee has clearly
intended to unconditionally exercise the option according to its terms7 6
particularly where the optionor has suffered no harm.77
Where an option is granted to co-optionees who do not act in con-
cert to exercise the option, the requirement that the option be exercised
in strict conformance with its terms is applied. If express terms have
not been provided to deal with this possibility, there are two questions:
can the option be exercised by less than all the co-optionees; and, if so,
what is the effect of such a less-than-all exercise on the rights of the
other optionees. Courts are likely to determine that co-optionees must
jointly exercise the option, an attempt by less than all being ineffec-
tive.78 However, the court may decide that each optionee has the power
to accept the offer embodied in the option, so an attempt by a co-op-
tionee to exercise would be effective, but the relative rights of the op-
tionees should be determined according to the rules of equity in an in-
terpleader action.7 9
Exercising an option does differ from accepting an offer in one sig-
nificant way. There is no "mail box rule"80 for exercising options. 81 The
change the terms, avoiding the payment of a brokerage commission and making a
smaller cash payment than proposed in the offer.)
75. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 45(2) (1981).
76. Birkmeier v. Herget Nat'l Bank of Pekin, 102 III. 2d 548, 468 N.E.2d 1220
(1984).
77. See, e.g., Stoffer v. Adams, 54 So. 2d 801 (Fla. 1951) (The optionee offered
the optionor a first mortgage to secure the monthly payments of part of the purchase
price when the option required only a second mortgage.)
78. In re Estate of Maguire v. McNutt, 204 Kan. 686, 466 P.2d 358 (1970);
Myers v. Western Realty & Constr., Inc., 130 Ariz. 274, 635 P.2d 867 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1981).
79. For example, the optionor should tender his performance to the court and let
the co-optionees fight it out amongst themselves. R.H. Pierce Manufacturing Corpora-
tion, v. Continental Manufacturing Co., Inc., 106 Idaho 342, 679 P.2d 142 (1984).
80. Under the "mail box" rule, an acceptance is effective the moment that it is
put out of possession, such as into the mail box.
81. As the Restatement explains, while ordinarily an acceptance may be made'
"in a manner and by a medium invited by an offer" and it is "operative and completes
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acceptance of an ordinary contract offer is effective when sent. In con-
trast, whatever notification or payment by the optionee is to be the
means of accepting that offer, it is not effective until received. As one
court explained, "the very nature of an option contract compels us to
view the 'mailbox rule' of acceptance as inapplicable. .. 82 because
that would alter the agreement by giving the optionee more time than
had been agreed upon.8"
An implied covenant of good faith may prevent an optionor from
undermining the optionee's attempts to exercise the option.84 However,
in the event that the attempt to exercise the option is defective, the
optionor does not have the duty of communicating that to the optionee,
nor does the optionor have a duty to inform the optionee how to cure
the defect. In Koplin v. Bennett,8" the court stated that:
We find no rule of law to the effect that the optionee, by serving on
[the] optionor an inadequate notice of election to exercise the op-
tion, casts on the optionor any duty to instruct or inform the op-
tionee of the particulars in which the election to exercise the option
fails to meet the terms and conditions thereof; nor do we find that
under such circumstances the optionor is required to take any af-
firmative action on the theory that the optionee will amend or cor-
rect an inadequate acceptance.8 6
However, it seems likely that courts in the future, borrowing the re-
quirement of good faith implied into contracts governed by the Uni-
form Commercial Code,87 will find that the duty of good faith also
binds an optionor to notify the optionee if an attempted exercise of the
the manifestation of mutual assent as soon as put out of the offeree's possession, with-
out regard to whether it ever reaches the offeror; but (b) an acceptance under an option
contract is not operative until received by the offeror." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 63 (1979).
82. Romain v. A. Howard Wholesale Co., 506 N.E.2d 1124, 1127 (Ind. Ct. App.
1987).
83. Id. at 1128.
84. Stockton v. Sowerwine, 690 P.2d 1202 (Wyo. 1984).
85. 155 So. 2d 568 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1963).
86. Id. at 573.
87. See, e.g., contracts for the sale of goods, commercial paper, documents of
title, etc. See U.C.C. § 1-203 (1977), "Obligation of Good Faith. Every contract or
duty within this Act imposes an obligation of good faith in its performance or enforce-
ment." A similar obligation had been proposed for real estate contracts by the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the American Bar Associa-
tion in the Uniform Land Transactions Act § 1-301 (1977).
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option is defective.
An offer can provide that its acceptance be by performance rather
than by giving a promise in exchange. The parties could agree that the
performance invited is payment of the purchase price.8 8 While such an
option might be reasonable in the purchase of goods, it invites problems
where real estate is being bought because the potential for title
problems mandates a title search prior to a buyer accepting title.,9 Ti-
tle searches, even under ideal conditions, take time. Absent a contrary
agreement, an option is exercised by notice which allows time for a title
search prior to the required closing. 0 Consequently, absent a clear ex-
pression to the contrary, an option will not be interpreted to require
tender of payment to be exercised."' However, the optionor may not
prevent the optionee from satisfying the terms. For example, if the op-
tion requires that the closing must take place within a certain period,
the optionor's refusal to show up for a closing would not prevent the
optionee from successfully exercising the option by giving notice of his
intent to perform and standing ready to do so within the specified
period.92
It should be remembered that the option and the sales contract,
which is formed when the option is exercised, are two different con-
tracts. Consequently, the discussion about the rules for exercising the
option should not be mistaken for rules regarding performance of the
obligations under the sales contract. Consistent with this distinction,
performance of the obligations under the contract, for example, pay-
ment of the purchase price, is not required within the option period
unless that is expressed or necessarily implied.' 3
88. See, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 45 (1979). "OPTION CON-
TRACT CREATED BY PART PERFORMANCE OR TENDER. (I) Where an offer invites an
offeree to accept by rendering a performance and does not invite a promissory accept-
ance, an option contract is created when the offeree tenders or begins the invited per-
formance or tenders a beginning of it."
89. See § V.E. infra.
90. Exercising an option by paying the purchase price prior to a title search
would be reasonable for the buyer only if the price, or a significant.part of it, were to
be escrowed and released to the seller only after completion of a satisfactory title
search and elimination of any title defects or clouds revealed by the search.
91. Hilltop Development v. Miller Hill Manor Co., 342 N.W.2d 344 (Minn.
1984).
92. Id.
93. See, e.g., Siders v. Odak, 126 A.D.2d 292 523, N.Y.S.2d 549, (1987) (where
the court held that a three year option requiring thirty days notice could be exercised
at any time during the three years creating the bilateral contract of sale which could be
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An option may be made subject to a condition precedent. The
power to exercise the option would be subject to the occurrence of an
event. In one example, an employer had conveyed land to his employee
as a site for the employee's home but subjected the conveyance to a
repurchase option.9' When the employee ceased working for the gran-
tor on the grantor's ranch, which surrounded the land in question, the
grantor could repurchase the land from the former employee. Another
example involved an option on an option. The optionor did not actually
own the land involved, but merely had an option on it. He had agreed
that if he exercised his option to purchase the land, his optionee would
have an option to purchase from him. That option was subject to a
condition precedent, the optionor exercising the other option first.9 5
Similarly, the failure of a condition subsequent, such as obtaining a
zoning change, may release the optionee from the sales contract cre-
ated when the option was exercised.96
IV. The Uses of Purchase Options
A. In General
Purchase options are frequently used as tools for structuring real
estate transactions.97 A developer may use purchase options to assem-
ble the land for a large project, acquiring options on parcels one by
performed according to its terms after the three year period); Lewis v. Chase, 23 Mass.
App. Ct. 673, 505 N.E.2d 211 (1987) (where the requirement of between thirty and
ninety days notice was held to define the time for the closing if the option was exercised
and not the time within which to exercise the option). See also Annotation, Necessity
For Payment Or Tender Of Purchase Money, Within Option Period To Exercise Op-
tion, In Absence Of Specific Time Requirement For Payment, 71 A.L.R.3d 1201
(1976).
94. Wells v. Gootrad, 112 Idaho 912, 736 P.2d 1366 (1987). The court held that
even though the optionor had ceased working involuntarily due to his leukemia, that
event triggered the seller's right to repurchase under the terms of the option.
95. Shelton v. Eisemann, 75 Fla. 644, 79 So. 75 (1918).
96. See, e.g., Annotation, Effect Of Provision In Real-Estate Option Or Land
Sale Contract Making The Contract Subject To Zoning Or Rezoning Of The Prop-
erty, 76 A.L.R.2d 1195 (1961).
97. Purchase options are the norm. However, on occasion one sees an option to
sell which binds the buyer to complete the purchase if the seller should decide to sell.
E.g., Skeen v. Clinchfield Coal Corp., 137 Va. 397, 119 S.E. 89 (1923) where the deed
provided that the purchasers of a tract from which a homesite was reserved were bound
to purchase the homesite at a fixed price if the owners ever decided to sell it. The
option, however, was held to violate the Rule against Perpetuities. See infra text § 5.D.
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one, until the needed land is under option. He avoids acquiring or even
obligating himself to acquire any land until he has decided that he can
acquire all the land needed for the successful development. If he is una-
ble to assemble all he needs, he can abandon the project and not exer-
cise the options. All he has lost is the cost of the options, which is small
in comparison to the what he would have spent in buying the land.98
Having abandoned the project, he is not burdened with land which he
does not need, nor bound by sales contracts under which he may forfeit
large deposits or be subjected to lawsuits for damages or specific
performance.
Land assembly is not the only reason developers use purchase op-
tions. Their use can make it possible to perform feasibility or market
studies and explore the possibilities of financing. If the rights were not
acquired prior to making the studies or the inquiries, the notoriety of
proposed development might drive up the prices, making the project too
expensive, inviting competition, or even making current owners unwill-
ing to sell their land. Also, locking in the price of the land eliminates
one variable, the cost of the land, from the study, making the study's
projections more likely to be accurate. By using purchase options, the
optionee acquires, for a minimal price, the time within which to get the
information needed to decide whether to go forward with the project.
In addition, to qualify for an otherwise unavailable financing or grant
program, a developer may transfer the land to an eligible entity, but
retain a repurchase option.9'
Options may also be used to help a developer finance a project
where the construction is to be sequential. Rather than purchase the
land himself, the land is purchased by the financier who is in a much
more secure position owning the land than if he were merely a mortga-
gee. The developer has the option to purchase parcels of the land, ei-
ther when it is ready to begin construction or when the construction is
completed and a buyer is under contract. The effect is to have the
lender warehouse the land, allowing the developer to call it from the
98. Of course, the cost of the options will depend on the value of the property,
the existence of other prospective buyers, the length of the option and the negotiating
skill of the buyer.
99. See, e.g., Town of Eustis v. Stratton-Eustis Development Corp., 516 A.2d
951 (Me. 1986). The town wanted to develop a campground using a loan from FHA,
but was ineligible so it created the Corporation as a "financial conduit" to borrow the
money. Unfortunately, the conveyance to the Corporation, rather than retaining an
option, only gave the town a right of first refusal, and the town's efforts to reclaim the
land by the vehicle of a constructive trust failed.
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inventory at an advantageous time. 100
Developers are not the only buyers to use purchase options. Where
the buyer's desire to purchase depends on contingencies which cannot
or will not be reduced to objective standards, the parties may be better
off utilizing an option rather than a contract with vague conditions
which will ultimately lead to litigation for clarification.' 01 The purchase
option is also an ideal tool for speculation. The speculator, seeing a
property which he thinks is marketable, acquires an option on it. If a
buyer can be located within the option period, the speculator profits by
selling the option or exercising it and later selling the contract or the
property itself. If no profitable sale can be arranged, the speculator
takes the cost of the option as a loss. This led to the charge in one case
that options should be held void as gambling contracts. However, the
Georgia Supreme Court refused the invitation to reach that
conclusion. 101
An option is also an appropriate device where the parties have
agreed to the sale of part of the seller's property but have left it to the
buyer to decide exactly which parcel.10 3 A seller may also entice a pro-
spective buyer to purchase one property with an option on another
property, possibly conditioned upon some other event 04 such as further
development at a later time.' 05 Conversely, a landowner may sell his
land subject to a repurchase option if development does not proceed
100. See, e.g., Connor v. Great Western Savings and Loan Ass'n, 69 Cal. 2d
850, 447 P.2d 609, 73 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1969). Note however, the court in that case held
that the lender could be held liable for construction defects due to the magnitude of its
involvement in the development process. See OSBORNE, NELSON AND WHITMAN, REAL
ESTATE FINANCE LAW § 12.11 (2d ed. 1979); Annotation, Financing Agency's Liabil-
ity to Purchaser of New Homes or Structures for Consequences of Construction De-
fects, 39 A.L.R.3d 247 (1971).
101. See Tempkin, Too Much Good Faith in Real Estate Purchase Agreements?
Give Me An Option, 34 U. KAN. L. REV. 43 (1985).
102. Baker v. Jellibeans, Inc., 252 Ga. 458, 314 S.E.2d 874 (1984).
103. However, it would not be an option if the parties were subsequently to agree
on the boundaries, rather than leaving the choice to be made by the optionee unilater-
ally. Turner v. Hostetler, 359 Pa. Super. 167, 518 A.2d 833 (1986).
104. The conditional option might be a right of first refusal, discussed infra in
III.A, or based upon some other condition precedent, e.g., the death of the seller or the
passage of a certain number of years.
105. See Baker v. McCarthy, 122 N.H. 171, 443 A.2d 138 (1982), where a lot
set back from the beachfront seemed more desirable when combined with an option to
obtain the land between it and the beach.
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according to plan." °6 Co-landowners may provide for a buy-out option
in the event one of them dies10 7 or wants to leave their joint venture.
Options are also used as a vehicle for restructuring transactions for tax
purposes.108
A business or a home-buyer may want to try out a location before
making a purchase commitment."0 9 However, an option would not enti-
tle the optionee to possession. Granting the optionee a license to be on
the premises may be sufficient for a short term try-out but would be
inadequate for many purposes because it would not give the optionee
any possessory rights during that period. For the optionee to have pos-
sessory rights would require a lease being granted in addition to the
option.
B. Lease-Options
A lease may include an option to purchase, an option to renew for
another term, or both, 110 but the discussion here is limited to options to
purchase the property. While an option must be supported by consider-
ation to become enforceable, separate consideration is not required for
the option contained in a lease."' The parties may wish to allocate
106. See Trailsend Land Co. v. Virginia Holding Corp., 228 Va. 319, 321 S.E.2d
667 (1984), noting, however, that the court interpreted the repurchase option to be a
condition subsequent to the grantee's estate.
107. Layne v. Henderson, 232 Va. 332, 351 S.E.2d 18 (1986).
108. See Hemsley v. Pannick, 131 AD.2d 940 516 N.Y.S.2d 804, (1987). A per-
son who was land rich but in need of cash approached his physician for a loan. The
physician's accountant suggested that they structure the arrangement as sales subject
to options to repurchase on the borrower's land, rather than loans secured by mort-
gages on that land, so that the physician would have the benefit of capital gains tax
treatment. Title problems prevented the repurchase and the court invoked the parol
evidence rule to limit the physician to the remedy specified if title problems arose, the
return of the consideration for the option. Also see discussion infra in § IV.D regarding
convertible mortgages.
109. See Duncan v. G.E.W., Inc, 526 A.2d 1358 (D.C. 1987), where the pur-
chaser of a chain of restaurants, rather than purchasing the locations, obtained leases
with purchase options. This minimized the risk because any location which was unsuc-
cessful could be abandoned when the lease expired. Furthermore, this minimized the
cash needed to acquire the chain. Thus the buyer had more money to invest in the
improvement and promotion of the restaurants during the critical start-up phase. See
also Lease-Options discussed infra.
110. See 2 M. FRIEDMAN, FRIEDMAN ON LEASES (2d Ed.) 757 (1983); 1 AMERI-
CAN LAW OF PROPERTY §§ 3.82-3.84 (1952).
I1l. A particularly difficult question is whether the renewal of the lease also
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between rent and the cost of the option due to the different tax treat-
ment of each.' 12 The lease with a purchase option is often used to en-
tice hesitant buyers. The theory is that the leases and options are much
less threatening to potential buyers than are purchase contracts. The
seller reasons that once the potential buyer is in possession, particularly
living in a residence, it will be much easier to convince him to stay put
and make the purchase, counting possibly on the factor of inertia, that
is, a body at rest tends to remain at rest.
The seller may also be able to attract buyers who could not other-
wise afford to make the purchase. Most institutional mortgages require
a down payment. The seller can attract buyers who do not have the
necessary down payment by promising to credit part, or all, of the
rental payments towards the purchase price. At a minimum, an option
promises to hold the price constant while the optionee tries to save up
or borrow money for the down payment. The potential buyer may be
more likely to lease the property knowing what the eventual purchase
price would be and having the time to decide if he wants to make the
purchase. For a business, the lease-option gives it a chance to test the
suitability of a location before making a purchase commitment.
The lease-option provides the seller with benefits in addition to po-
tential buyers. During the lease term, the property will produce regular
income. If the owner is under the pressure of making mortgage pay-
ments on the property, the lease-option may off-set the cash flow drain
of the mortgage payments and may even produce some profit. In addi-
tion, the property is occupied rather than remaining empty. Even if this
lessee-optionee does not make the purchase, it may facilitate the sale to
a third party because it is generally considered easier to sell an occu-
pied property than a vacant one and occupied properties are not as
likely to be subjected to vandalism or theft.
Coupling the option with a lease may provide some difficult
extends the tenant's option for the duration of the new lease term. In Sisco v. Roten-
berg, 104 So. 2d 365 (Fla. 1958), the Florida Supreme Court, citing what it labeled the
majority rule, held that an option for which separate consideration had not been paid
was not an independent or collateral covenant. Consequently, extension of the lease also
extended the option.
112. The payment for the option is not recognized as income to the optionor until
the option either expires or is exercised. If exercised, the option payment is treated as
part of the purchase price of the property. For the optionee, the option price is then
added to the cost basis of the purchased property. The cost of an option which was
allowed to expire would be treated as a loss from the sale of underlying property. See
SAMANSKY AND SMITH, FEDERAL TAXATION OF REAL ESTATE § 7.01[5][a].
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problems regarding the interaction of landlord-tenant law and option
law. For example, the tenant's default on the obligations under the
lease may affect his right to exercise the option,"'3 and the premature
termination of the lease would normally terminate the tenant's rights
under the option.' 14 The tenant who has held over after the expiration
of the lease may be unable to exercise the option, but the tenant who
has extended or renewed his lease should still be able to exercise the
option during the renewed or extended period.115 Whether a rent con-
trol statute would affect the landlord's ability to charge additional for
an option to purchase in a rent controlled unit would depend on the
particularities of that statute." Careful drafting of the lease and the
option may resolve many of the lease-connected issues.
Another version of the lease-option is the lease-purchase con-
tract."' Under this, the tenant has the right to take title when all the
payments specified total up to the purchase price. Otherwise, the pay-
ments are treated as rent. Essentially, the buyer has the option which is
exercised by performance, by making the payments. This is usually
structured to appear to be a contract of sale which, in the event of
buyer default, limits the seller's remedies to the forfeiture of the
113. See Annotation, Lessee's Breach of or Default Under Lease Agreement as
Affecting His Right in Respect of Option to Purchase Under the Lease, 53 A.L.R.3d
435 (1973). For the opposite situation, i.e., the landlord's breach, see Annotation, Ten-
ant's Rights Under Unexercised Option to Purchase As Affected By Landlord's Breach
of Lease or Lease Agreement, 12 A.L.R.3d 1128 (1967); Annotation, 17 A.L.R.3d 976
(1968).
114. See Annotation, Termination Of Lease As Termination Of Option To
Purchase Therein Contained, 10 A.L.R.2d 884 (1950).
115. 111 Lounge, Inc. v. Gaines, 217 Neb. 466, 348 N.W.2d 903 (1984). See
Annotation, Holding Over Under Lease, Or Renewal Or Extention Thereof, As Ex-
tending Time For Exercise Of Option To Purchase Contained Therein, 15 A.L.R.3d
470 (1967). But see Williams v. Williams, 347 N.W.2d 893 (S.D. 1984). The South
Dakota statute provides that the parties are presumed to have renewed a lease on the
same terms, but an option is regarded as an independent covenant and not a term of
the lease under that statute. However, the right of first refusal involved in that case
was regarded as a term of the lease and, therefore, a part of the renewed lease because
it limited the landlord's ability to terminate the leasehold by selling to a third party.
116. See Annotation, Enforceability Of Option To Purchase, Consideration For
Which Is Payment Of Rentals Exceeding Rent Control Law Maximum, 28 A.L.R.2d
1204 (1953).
117. See Annotation, Construction And Operation of 'Optional Agreement - Flat
Payment' Land Contract Under Which Optionee Has Right to Take Title When Peri-
odic Payments (Otherwise To Be Treated As Rent) Equal Agreed Price, 55 A.L.R.3d
159 (1974).
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buyer's deposit." 8
The presence of the option may have a significant effect on the
tenant's attempt to renew the lease. Ordinarily, renewal requires strict
compliance with the terms of the renewal option. The strict compliance
requirement is tempered somewhat when the option appears in a lease.
Because failure to renew a lease would terminate not only the lease but
also the purchase option, doctrine has evolved to mitigate the effect of
faulty attempts to renew the lease which contains a purchase option."
For example, in Duncan v. G.E. W., Inc., 20 the buyer of a chain of
restaurants acquired a lease from the seller for each of the restaurant
sites. The identical leases each included an option to purchase as well
as renewal options. The optionee/lessee's president was late in giving
the renewal notice and the landlord refused to recognize the late notice.
The court held that there must be strict compliance with the renewal
option unless equity intervenes. Equitable relief should occur when 1)
the tenant's delay was based on an honest mistake and not mere neg-
lect, 2) the delay was slight, 3) the landlord had not relied to his detri-
ment on the failure of the tenant to give notice, and 4) strict enforce-
ment of the notice term would result in an unconscionable hardship for
the tenant. On reviewing the factors of this case, it concluded that eq-
uitable relief would be appropriate because: the delay was only seven-
teen days until oral notice and twenty three days until written notice
was given; the delay was based upon an honest mistake; the landlord
had not relied upon the nonrenewal to his detriment; the landlord knew
that the tenant intended to renew; the tenant had made substantial im-
provements; and the landlord would reap a windfall if renewal did not
occur. Critical to the court's conclusion that the forfeiture of the lease
renewal would be unconscionable was the magnitude of the loss which
the tenant would suffer from the forfeiture contrasted with the land-
lord's unjustified gain from it.
In contrast, the late renewal notice was not effective in Brick
Plaza, Inc. v. Humble Oil & Refining Company. 2' The tenant had
constructed two buildings on the land and had rebuilt one after a fire.
However, the tenant's excuse, that the late renewal was an honest mis-
118. See Section I, supra.
119. See Annotation, Circumstances Excusing Lessee's Failure To Give Timely
Notice Of Exercise Of Option To Renew Or Extend The Lease, 27 A.L.R.4th 266
(1984).
120. 526 A.2d 1358 (D.C. 1987).
121. 218 N.J. Super. 101, 526 A.2d 1139 (1987).
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take based upon reliance on the terms of a preliminary unexecuted
draft of the lease, demonstrated that the tenant had been negligent,
particularly in light of the fact that the renewal provision was obviously
the subject of specific negotiation. Furthermore, the delay of over five
months was not slight. The court pointed out that equity should inter-
fere with caution because business people need order and predictability
and simply balancing the equities to determine if the delay should be
excused would create intolerable uncertainty.
C. Rights of First Refusal
A right of first refusal is a contractual right to preempt another
buyer. 12 It is also known as a preemptive right and has also been de-
scribed as a "preferential right to purchase,"'2 3 a "first right to
buy,"' 124 or a "first option to buy."' 25 A land seller may want this right
in order to control the identity or activities of the buyer's successors.
This often occurs where the seller plans to occupy, use or develop
nearby property. Preemptive rights are commonly included in the arti-
cles or by-laws of condominiums or co-operatives, as well as in deeds
where there is a homeowners' association. They may also occur where
the owner was unwilling to sell certain property or rights at the mo-
ment, but for a price, or as an enticement, 2 is willing to give this
person the first chance if he should ever change his mind.
The right of first refusal is an option to purchase which is subject
to an agreed condition precedent, generally the optionor's receipt of an
offer and the good faith 27 decision to accept it. 28 The occurrence of
122. Consequently, it is often described as a pre-emptive right. It is also been
termed an "independent privilege," Hood v. Hawkins, 478 A.2d 181, 185 (R.I. 1984),
citing Butler v. Richardson, 74 R.I. 1344, 60 A.2d 718 (1945), and is also referred to
as an option. See e.g. Iglehart v. Phillips, 383 So. 2d 610 (Fla. 1980). See Annotation,
Option To Purchase At Price Offered To Optionor By Third Person, 136 A.L.R. 138
(1942).
123. Cherokee Water Company v. Forderhause, 641 S.W.2d 522 (Tex. 1982)
which involved a deed in which the grantor reserved a preferential right to purchase
minerals.
124. Hood v. Hawkins, 478 A.2d 181 (R.I. 1984).
125. Town of Eustis v. Stratton-Eustis Development Corp., 516 A.2d 951 (Me.
1986).
126. For example, as an enticement to purchase or lease a property, the grantee
may be given the right of first refusal on the adjoining property or on the property
which the grantee preferred but the owner was not yet willing to sell or rent.
127. Accordingly, a sale for one dollar for the improper purpose of defeating a
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these events satisfies the condition and makes the option operative, i.e.,
when that occurs, the right of first refusal is triggered and ripens into
an option which can now be exercised. 12 9 An unripened preemptive
right gives the holder of the right no power to force the owner to sell.
The optionor must notify the right holder of his receipt of the offer and
his decision to accept it, and at least one court has held that the op-
tionee is entitled to receive a copy of the triggering offer."' However, a
right of first refusal is not ordinarily triggered by an offer which is
subject to conditions which have not been met.13 1
It seems consistent that the holder of a right of first refusal cannot
exercise that right against the buyer at a forced sale, for example, a
foreclosure, 32 because the conditions precedent, the offer and decision
right of first refusal was not to be allowed. MacDonald v. Hawker, 11 Mass. App. Ct.
869, 420 N.E.2d 923 (1981). Similarly, following a conveyance for one dollar and sub-
sequent reconveyance for the alleged purpose of defeating a right of first refusal, the
court considered the case as if the transfers had not occurred. Fisher v. Fisher, 23
Mass. App. Ct. 205, 500 N.E.2d 821 (1986).
128. See Estate of Johnson v. Carr, 288 Ark. 461, 706 S.W.2d 388 (1986)
(where the condition, that if the owner should "desire to sell," had not been satisfied by
sending a letter that it was "seriously considering" selling and wanted to open negotia-
tions); Robichaux v. Boutte, 492 So. 2d 521 (La. Ct. App. 1986) (where the optionor's
letter indicating that she had received an offer but had not yet decided whether to sell
did not trigger the optionee's right of first refusal and, consequently, the optionee could
specifically enforce the right against the buyer); Vietor v. Sill, 243 So. 2d 198 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 1971) (where all apartment owners had agreed to give the others the
right of first refusal, an owner refused to sell to the others because she had not entered
a binding contract to sell to another. The court concluded however, that the terms of
the agreement did not require a binding contract to invoke the right of first refusal but
merely an intention to sell). But see New Haven Trap Rock Company v. Tata, 149
Conn. 181, 177 A.2d 798 (1962) (where the right was triggered if the owner should
"consider selling").
129. Green v. First American Bank and Trust , 12 Fla. L. Week 906, 511 So. 2d
569 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
130. Gyurkey v. Babler, 103 Idaho 663, 651 P.2d 928 (1982), which is analyzed
in Stutzman and Day, Protecting the Preemptor: Real Property Rights of First Re-
fusal in Light of Gyurkey v. Babler, 19 IDAHO L. REv. 277 (1983).
131. For example, in H.G. Fabric Discount, Inc. v. Pomerantz, 515 N.Y.S.2d
823 (1987), tenants had, as a term in their lease, a right of first refusal. They declined
to purchase at the price offered by a prospective purchaser who had conditioned his
offer on the premises being unoccupied, a condition which was not satisfied. The court
held that the tenants had not waived their right. Consequently, they could assert their
right when the landlord received a subsequent purchaser.
132. See Annotation, Rights Of Holder Of "First Refusal" Option On Real
Property In Event Of Sale At Foreclosure Or Other Involuntary Sale, 17 A.L.R.3d
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to accept, have not occurred. If the mortgage or lien is senior to the
right of first refusal, the right would be extinguished by the foreclo-
sure.' 33 Although this result would seem to defeat the intent of the par-
ties, it should be remembered that the holder of any other subordinate
right would be in the same position and the only way to be certain of
acquiring the property would be to purchase it at the forced sale.
The decision of the optionor to sell a larger parcel which includes
the land creates special problems. The owner may receive an offer on a
larger property which includes the subject parcel. The right holder
should not be forced to preempt the offer on the larger property be-
cause that purchase is larger and more costly than the one for which he
bargained, and he should not lose the right to the smaller parcel for
which he has paid. Conversely, he should not be entitled to a right of
first refusal on the larger parcel because he did not pay for that. The
seller should not, where the smaller is critical to the larger sale, have to
suffer the disproportionate harm of losing the larger sale because of the
need to make the smaller one. The solution, of course, is that the par-
ties should consider the possibility and expressly provide an answer to
the question of whether the parties intended that an offer on the larger
parcel would trigger the right of first refusal and, if so, whether the
right holder would have to match the offer on the entire parcel.
Where the parties have not foreseen the possibilities or have failed
to express their agreement in clear terms, the court must struggle to
determine their probable intent. No clear pattern of interpretation has
emerged,3 except that the right of first refusal cannot be intentionally
circumvented by arranging to sell the subject land as a part of the
larger sale.'3 " In the case of a bona fide offer on the larger tract, each
962 (1968).
133. However, if the optionee had not been joined as a party to the judicial pro-
ceeding leading to the sale or been given notice of a nonjudicial sale, the right could
still be asserted against the buyer. The buyer may be protected from an unrecorded
option under the state's recording system and, in any event, ordinarily may bring a
subsequent reforeclosure action joining the right holder and terminating his rights.
134. Compare Sawyer v. Firestone, 513 A.2d 36 (R.I. 1986) (where a seller
breached a contract to sell land and the right of first refusal on neighboring land by
insisting that the deed specify that the right of first refusal would apply only in the
event that the land was sold as a separate parcel) with Crow-Spieker #23 v. Robert L.
Helms Construction and Development Co., 731 P.2d 348 (Nev. 1987) (where an offer
to purchase the larger tract was held not to trigger the right of first refusal on the
included parcel).
135. Myers v. Lovetinsky, 189 N.W.2d 571 (Iowa 1971); Maron v. Howard, 258
Cal. App. 2d 473, 66 Cal. Rptr. 70 (1968); K.S. & S. Restaurant Corp. v. Yarbrough,
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case appears to turn on the equities of the situation. Ordinarily, the
right holder can enjoin the sale,"3 6 but under certain circumstances, the
right holder may lose the right,137 may be allowed to specifically en-
force the right at a proportionate price or at the fair market value, 3 8 or
even may be limited to damages. 39
The method of exercising a right of first refusal is the same as
exercising an option because that is what the right has ripened into on
the satisfaction of the conditions precedent. This was illustrated by
Pearson v. Fulton'" where the agreement granted a right of first re-
fusal which would expire 120 days from delivery to the right holder of
a certified copy of any executed or accepted offer. On hearing that a
contract had been entered, the holder sent a letter headed by the word
"notice" which stated that "we hereby elect to exercise that right of
first refusal. .. "'" and initiated suit to enforce the right. The trial
court concluded that the notice exercising the right of first refusal
merely began the time within which to exercise the option. The appel-
late court reversed. It reiterated that a right of first refusal "ripens"
into an option once the owner manifests a willingness to accept a good
faith offer from the third person. " 2 Consequently, exercising the right
of first refusal would be exercising the option.
Ordinarily, a right of first refusal will bind the optionee to
104 A.D.2d 486, 479 N.Y.S.2d 235 (1984).
136. Guaclides v. Kruse, 67 N.J. Super. 348, 170 A.2d 488 (1961).
137. Crow-Spieker #23 v. Robert L. Helms Construction and Development Co.,
731 P.2d 348 (Nev. 1987).
138. See, e.g., Pantry Pride Enterprises, Inc. v. Stop and Shop Cos., 806 F.2d
1227 (4th Cir. 1986), which involved a right of first refusal to repurchase a sublease
interest. The sublessee received an offer to sell its supermarkets, including the one lo-
cated at the sublease. The terms of the offer allocated part of the price to acquisition of
the sublease and the rest to the purchase of the equipment. The right holder attempted
to exercise its right as to the sublease only, not including the equipment, at the price
allocated to the sublease in the offer. The court upheld the right holder's right to ac-
quire the sublease, but at the fair market value, not the price allocated in the offer,
because that would yield a windfall for the optionee. The allocation in the offer had
been legitimately structured to maximize the tax benefits.
139. See Stutzman and Day, Protecting the Preemptor: Real Property Rights of
First Refusal in Light of Gyurkey v. Babler, 19 IDAHO L. REv. 277 (1983); Annota-
tion, Option To Purchase Real Property As Affected By Optionor's Receipt Of Offer
For, Or Sale Of, Larger Tract Which Includes The Optioned Parcel, Annotation, 34
A.L.R.4th 1217 (1984).
140. 497 So. 2d 898 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
141. Id. at 899.
142. Id. at 900.
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purchase according to the exact terms of the offer which he has pre-
empted and, absent agreement to the contrary, that is the way a right
would be construed. 4" Considering all the variable terms, besides the
price, involved in a sales contract, 144 the right holder is taking a great
risk of being faced with the choice of an onerous contract or losing the
land. Of course, the parties could agree in advance to any or all of the
terms of the contract of sale by which the preemptor could purchase,
leaving only specific terms to be filled in from the preempted offer.
That occurred in Shower v. Fischer, ' discussed below, where the
purchase price was to be ten percent below the appraised value, rather
than the price of the offer which had triggered the right.
The obligation to pay a brokerage commission may produce com-
plications. Normally, the seller contracts with a real estate broker to
find a buyer and, ordinarily, the seller pays the brokerage commission
out of his proceeds from the sale, but the seller may be liable for that
commission under the terms of the agreement even if the property is
not purchased by the person he found.'" If the seller will be liable for
143. Coastal Bay Golf Club, Inc. v. Holbein, 231 So. 2d 854 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1970). But see Hood v. Hawkins, 478 A.2d 181 (R.I. 1984), holding a right of
first refusal void as being too speculative where the price term is not fixed and no
method was provided for fixing the price.
144. For example, type of contract (i.e., is it an installment contract requiring
periodic payments over a long term prior to the transfer of title to the buyer or is it an
executory contract in which the entire purchase price is due shortly at an imminent
closing), financing terms, right to possession prior to closing, risk of loss and cost of
insurance prior to closing, conditions concerning the status of the title or defects in
structures.
145. 47 Wash. App. 720, 737 P.2d 291 (1987). See text at note 152, infra.
146. The historical rule has been that, absent agreement to the contrary, the
broker would be entitled to his commission when he produces a buyer who is ready,
willing and able to purchase the property according to the listed terms. St. Petersburg
Land & Loan Co. v. Shallcross, 84 Fla. 575, 94 So. 502 (1922); Acheson v. Smiths,
Inc, 148 So. 576 (Fla. 1933). However, that rule has begun to erode because some
courts have the perception that the parties expect that the commission will be paid out
of the proceeds of the sale. Ellsworth Dobbs, Inc. v. Johnson, 50 N.J. 528, 236 A.2d
843 (1967); Tristram's Landing, Inc. v. Wait, 367 Mass. 622, 327 N.E.2d 727 (1975);
Caperruto v. John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co., 394 Mass. 399, 476 N.E.2d
188 (1985). A unilateral contract under which any broker may earn the commission by
being the one to procure such a buyer is called an "open listing." However, the seller
and broker may agree that this broker will be entitled a commission on the sale of the
property to anyone (called "an exclusive right of sale" brokerage contract) or on the
sale of the property to anyone other than a buyer procured by the seller himself (an
"exclusive agency" brokerage contract). An exclusive right of sale is probably becom-
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the commission regardless of who purchases, then there is no problem
because the preemptor must exactly match the third party's offer. Sim-
ilarly, if the third party's offer includes a term making the buyer liable
for the brokerage commission,' 7 then the preemptor must also agree to
assume that liability even though he did not contract for the broker's
services. 4'8 But, when the seller will not be liable to pay a brokerage
commission if the property is sold to the preemptor, the question arises
whether the preemptor may subtract the amount which the seller would
have paid for a commission from the amount which he must pay for the
property. Put more simply, must the preemptor match the other offer
exactly, even though that means that the seller will reap a windfall in
the amount of the brokerage commission which he will not have to pay
because of the preemption, or need the preemptor only put the seller in
the same position which he would have been in had the preemption not
occurred.
In Reef v. Bernstein,' 9 the court determined that the question was
to be decided based upon the intent of the parties. The court concluded
that the normal expectations of the parties to a right of first refusal
would be that the seller would be in the same position regardless of
whether he sold to the holder of the right or to the third party. In the
absence of contrary language, that is the probable intent of the parties
and so the preemptor could subtract from its price the amount of com-
mission which would have been paid if the sale to the third party had
been completed.5 0 It acknowledged that the more mechanistic ap-
proach taken by some courts""' would have produced a different result,
ing the most common type of arrangement today because of the investment of time,
effort and, sometimes, advertising money involved in locating prospective buyers. Under
it, the seller would be liable for a commission on sale of the property to the preemptor.
147. Where the land is subject to a right of first refusal, it seems that sellers
often want the buyer to pay for any broker's commission. This seems to be based on the
fact that many brokerage agreements provide that the seller will be liable for the com-
mission even if the land is sold to a third party. Many sellers are unhappy with the
prospect of having to pay a commission under those circumstances and so having the
seller assume that cost becomes an important point of negotiation. In reality, the seller
probably ends up receiving the same amount in the end.
148. Coastal Bay Golf Club, Inc. v. Holbein, 231 So. 2d 854 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1970).
149. 23 Mass. App. Ct. 599, 504 N.E.2d 374 (1987).
150. Id. at 602-603, 504 N.E.2d at 377 (citing C. Roberts Nattress & Associates
v. Cidco, 184 Cal. App. 3d 55, 72-73, 229 Cal. Rptr. 33, 43 (1986)).
151. Id. at 603, 504 N.E.2d at 377 (citing Coastal Bay Golf Club, Inc. v.
Holbein, 231 So. 2d 854 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1970) and Hartmann v. Windsor
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but rejected such an approach.
Shower v. Fischer52 illustrates the operation of a right of first re-
fusal and the features which distinguish it from an ordinary purchase
option. The original owners, the Fischers, conveyed part of their land to
the Murrays, and gave the purchasers a "first offer of refusal to
purchase" the land which they had retained. The Murrays later sold
their land, to B-Haven, Inc., including in the sale an assignment of the
purchase right.153 When B-Haven wrote the Showers informing them
of its purchase right, the Showers commenced an action to rescind their
contract and the Fischers eventually agreed to the rescission. B-Haven,
however, continued to insist that it now had the right to purchase the
entire Fischer property at the below-appraisal price and the trial court
agreed.
The appellate court reasoned that the case turned on whether B-
Haven had a right of first refusal or an option. A right of first refusal
does not give the right holder the power to force an unwilling seller to
sell. It merely gives the holder the right to preempt another buyer if
the seller has decided to sell. If B-Haven had a right of first refusal, it
was triggered by acceptance of the Showers' offer, but rescission of the
Fischer-Shower contract of sale apparently returned the parties to the
status quo ante, so the event which would have ripened the right into
an enforceable option would be missing. There was no willing seller and
no prospective buyer for the right holder to preempt. 54 Consequently,
if B-Haven had a right of first refusal, it would lose. However, if B-
Haven had an option, it could force the landowner to sell because exer-
cising the option would give it an enforceable contract of sale.155
Whether this term was an option or a right of first refusal would
Hotel Co., 132 W. Va. 307, 52 S.E.2d 48 (1949) as examples of the mechanistic ap-
proach which requires that the preemptor exactly match the third party's offer.)
152. 47 Wash. App. 720, 737 P.2d 291 (1987). See also Green v. First Ameri-
can Bank and Trust, 511 So. 2d 569, (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1987). Note that a party
could obtain both an option to purchase at a fixed price and a right of first refusal. The
rights, unless otherwise specified, would be cumulative. Failing to exercise one would
not extinguish the right to exercise the other. See Annotation, Construction and Effect
of Options to Purchase at Specified Price and at Price Offered by Third Person, In-
cluded in Same Instrument, 22 A.L.R.4th 1293 (1983).
153. The issue of whether the purchase right could be assigned will be discussed
in section V.A. infra.
154. Relying on Robroy Land Co., Inc. v. Prather, 95 Wash. 2d 66, 71-72, 622
P.2d 367 (1980). See also American Law of Property § 26.64.
155. Relying on Beets v. Tyler, 365 Mo. 895, 290 S.W.2d 76, 81 (1956).
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depend on the intent of the parties. The court concluded that the lan-
guage created a right of first refusal because it referred to a refusal to
purchase. That would imply that the purchaser had received another
offer first and that would not occur in an option situation.
An agreement could, however, contain both an option and a right
of first refusal. This produces a problem where the seller has received
an offer for more than the option price. Can the optionee still exercise
the option and purchase for the option price or, now that the right of
first refusal has been triggered, is he limited to exercising that at the
price offered by the third party? Once again, the question is resolved
by determining the intent of the parties. The individuality of the agree-
ments has led the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to state that "a deci-
sion construing one instrument containing both a fixed price option and
a right of first refusal option will not necessarily control a case involv-
ing a different instrument." M The fact that the fixed price option, if
not exercised prior to a sale, would be enforceable against the op-
tionor's successors and by its own terms could be enforced "at any
time" led the court to the conclusion that the agreement here gave the
optionee the choice of exercising the option or the right of first refusal
and, consequently, the right to purchase the property at the lower of
the option price or the third party's offer.1 57 However, the dissent
makes a strong case, based upon the principles of equity and fair deal-
ing, for the rule that in the absence of express provisions, the fixed
price term should be terminated when the right of first refusal is trig-
gered by a third party's offer. Otherwise, the option price is an effective
cap on the market value of the property.
The question has arisen whether a right of first refusal would be
triggered by the offer of one co-owner to buy out the rights of another.
Absent specific agreement on the subject, the court would have to de-
termine what the parties to the right had intended. In Baker v. McCar-
thy,' " the New Hampshire Supreme Court used the language of the
deed to determine their probable intent by focusing on the use of the
plural term, grantors, referring to the optionors, as the recipients of the
offer which would trigger the right. The court concluded that the par-
ties contemplated an offer made to all of the co-owner/optionors from
an outside buyer. An outsider purchasing the land would become "a
156. Amoco Oil Co. v. Snyder, 478 A.2d 795, 797 (Pa. 1984), citing Bobali Cor-
poration v. Tamapa Company, 235 Pa. Super. 1, 9, 340 A.2d 485, 490 (1975).
157. Accord., Texaco, Inc. v. Creel, 310 N.C. 695, 314 S.E.2d 506 (1984).
158. 122 N.H. 171, 443 A.2d 138 (1982).
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third party to the ownership picture who would adversely affect the
plaintiff's rights contemplated by the provisions of her deed." 15 9 What
the optionee had bargained for was the opportunity to avoid having to
deal with a stranger in such proximity. Because an offer by a present
co-owner would not have the effect of adding any new parties, it was
not one of the events intended to trigger her right of first refusal.
Strict compliance with a right of first refusal may be waived. That
was asserted in Coastal Bay Golf Club, Inc. v. Holbein. 60 Counsel for
one of the sellers had called for an indemnification agreement to sup-
plement the buyers' nonconforming exercise of the right and that,
claimed the buyers, had waived the requirement of strict compliance.
The court pointed out, however, that the sellers were in no position to
waive the rights of a third party. This right of first refusal had been
triggered by the optionor accepting an offer from another person. That
person now had a contract, subject only to the right of first refusal and
only he could waive his rights under that contract. Logically, if the
right of first refusal had been triggered by the seller only deciding to
sell, but not actually accepting another offer, then the seller could in-
tentionally or accidentally waive the optionee's strict compliance with
the terms of the right such as exactly matching the prior offer.
D. Convertible Mortgages
A mortgage which also gives the mortgagee the option to purchase
an interest in the financed development is referred to as a "convertible
mortgage" because the mortgagee can convert the mortgage into a con-
tract to purchase an ownership interest.1 61 The convertible mortgage
159. Id. at 776, 443 A.2d at 141.
160. 231 So. 2d 854 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1970).
161. Some of the literature speaks of the convertible mortgagee being able to
convert the mortgage interest directly into an ownership interest. This is slightly mis-
leading because it sounds as if that could take place simply by exercising the converti-
ble feature without the necessity of a conveyance. While an equitable interest in the
property would no doubt spring to the mortgagee at that moment, for the mortgagee to
get a legal title, and certainly to get a marketable title, would require a conveyance
from the mortgagor to the mortgagee. What would obligate the mortgagor to convey
would be the contract to convey which the exercised option had become. See generally
Siegman and Linquanti, The Convertible, Participating Mortgage: Planning Opportu-
nities and Legal Pitfalls in Structuring the Transaction, 54 U. COLO. L. REV. 295
(1983); Nellis, Taking a Closer Look: Convertible Mortgages: A Brief Review of the
Legal and Drafting Issues, 8 REAL PROP. LAW REP. I, CALIFORNIA CONTINUING LE-
GAL EDUCATION (1985). Note that the term convertible mortgage is also used, on occa-
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was designed primarily to protect the lender in a period of rising inter-
est rates and inflation by allowing the lender to recoup whatever profits
were lost due to the low interest rate from the profits of the sale of the
property. This inflation protection was intended to convince the lender
to make the loans that they would otherwise be afraid to make.162
In addition, the lender's anticipated future profit may convince it
to make the loan for a greater amount and at rates below the current
market because the final yield, if the option is exercised, would still be
greater than the return on a conventional loan. 63 Lower interest rates
mean lower mortgage payments, frequently interest-only during the ini-
tial phase, lessening the likelihood that the borrower will develop cash
flow problems and increasing the possibilities that the project will be a
success.
The option is also used to restructure a financing transaction to
maximize the borrower's tax benefits 164 while minimizing the lender's
risks of liability in contract or tort. The lender may maximize the bene-
fits of participating in the profits of a venture, but avoid the risks of the
venture.' 1 5 Rather than utilize an ordinary loan, secured by a mortgage
or other debt instrument, or have the lender acquire an interest in the
development, becoming a co-venturer, a partner or an equity partici-
pant, one could utilize a mortgage combined with an option to purchase
an interest, possibly the entire fee simple, at a designated point in the
future. At that time the lender should know if the venture is going to
be profitable.
This leaves the developer with the legal title in the property. The
sion, for another purpose, to describe the type of adjustable rate mortgage which allows
the mortgagor to "convert" to a fixed rate according to specified terms.
162. The convertible mortgage "was designed principally as a tax efficient infla-
tion hedge for American pension fund investors . . . which evolved in response to an
unprecedented period of escalating inflation and interest rates." Norstrand, The Con-
vertible Mortgage and the Equity of Redemption, 26 BOSTON B.J. 25, 26 (Sept, 1982).
Note, however, that some types of lenders are limited in their ability to enter converti-
ble mortgages. For illustrations see Legal Restrictions on Equity Participation Financ-
ings, 20 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. L. J. 1139 (1985); Siegman and Linquanti, supra
note 161, at 375-392.
163. See Mailer, Financing Ideas: Legal Concerns in Convertible Mortgage
Transactions, 13 REAL ESTATE L.J. 277 (1984); Oharenko, Convertible Mortgages
Gain Big League Attention, 44 MORTGAGE BANKING 20 (July, 1984).
164. See Wyndelts and Parker, Using Options to Enhance Tax Benefits for Real
Estate: An Overlooked Tool, 2 J. TAX'N INVESTMENTS 213-225 (1985).
165. Siegman and Linquanti, supra note 161 at 299-321 (regarding the converti-
ble mortgage holder as a partner or creditor of the mortgagor.)
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lender has neither legal nor equitable title because equitable conversion
does not apply to vest an equitable interest in him until the option is
exercised and the accepted offer becomes a contract of sale.'66 The de-
veloper, on the other hand, would benefit from the tax treatment of the
arrangement, prior to the exercise of the option, as a loan which leaves
it the owner in fee of depreciable property.167 Also, the cash to the
borrower is in the form of a loan which is not taxed as income from the
sale of an interest.'68 If the lender is not subject to income taxation, for
example, if it is a pension fund or a governmental unit, it would not be
harmed by this characterization of the payments as mortgage pay-
ments, usually all interest.
The lender would benefit from the flexibility of deciding at a later
time if it prefers to ultimately be treated as a lender or an owner. Until
it decides, the experienced management of the developer, having the
incentives of ownership, remains in control. Meanwhile, the lender has
the ideal position to observe the performance of the property to deter-
mine if ownership would be worthwhile. Also, the option is a valuable
asset which could sell or hypothecate to third.' 69 Until the option is
exercised, the lender is guaranteed the income of the regular mortgage
payments. 7 0
166. See supra note 26.
167. Regarding the benefits of convertible mortgage financing, see Oharenko,
supra note 163 at 20; Nellis, supra note 161, at 8, which states that the tax advantages
to the borrower/optionor include that capital gains tax is avoided until the conversion
occurs, that the borrower/optionor used the convertible mortgage device to hold the
property long enough to qualify for the capital gains holding period, and that dealer
status may be avoided by staggering the sales, thus avoiding ordinary income
treatment.
168. Preble and Cartwright, Convertible and Shared Appreciation Loans: Un-
clogging the Equity of Redemption, 20 REAL PROP. PROB AND TR. J. 821, 822 (Fall
1985). However, the fee paid to the owner/borrower for the option is another matter. It
is taxable income. Note that convertible mortgages are often grouped in discussion with
shared appreciation or equity participation mortgages. In the ordinary equity participa-
tion or shared appreciation mortgage, the mortgagee is a participant from the first day.
The convertible feature allows the mortgagee to delay deciding until some point after
the execution of the mortgage whether to become a participant in the income and
growth of the venture. A mortgage may combine both features, e.g., a participation
from the first day and the option for additional participation in the future.
169. Ellis and Abramowitz, Contracts as Commodities: Issues and Approaches
in Regard to Commercial Real Estate "Earnest Money" and "Option" Contracts-A
Texas Lawyer's Perspective, 16 ST. MARY'S L.J. 541 (1985).
170. Oharenko, supra note 163, at 22, which points out, "a typical convertible
mortgage is structured as a participating loan with a competitive coupon rate that in-
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Frequently it is the borrower who seeks this method of financing.
Borrowers may prefer the convertible mortgage over other forms of eq-
uity participation financing because they retain control over the devel-
opment as well as the tax benefits of the interest and depreciation de-
ductions. 171 The optionor has a built-in market for the sale of the
successful project, meaning a sale without the cost of brokers' fees, pos-
sibly 10%, and the delay involved in finding a buyer. 7 2 However, a
negative aspect for the borrower is the lack of control over the exercise
of the option which the lender will time to maximize its profits, possibly
to the detriment of the borrower. 78
Convertible mortgages are not without their problems. They are
intricate transactions and that may result in greatly increased legal fees
and mortgage underwriting fees limiting their availability to large deals
involving experienced developers.7 4 There is also the danger that the
option may not be exercisable if the project begins to fail, the very time
when the lender may decide to take over the project as quickly as possi-
ble. A mortgagee who felt that the option protected it from possible
losses caused by the borrower's default would be in for a surprise. Al-
though the lender might want to exercise the option and take over the
project if the borrower got into financial trouble, it may be prohibited
from doing so because the option may be held invalid as an attempt to
clog the defaulting borrower's equity of redemption under the mort-
gage. 1' The effect, should the borrower default, would be to require
cludes additional interest payments in the form of cash flow participation."
171. Id.
172. See Id.; 8 REAL PROP. LAW REP., (CALIFORNIA CONTINUING LEGAL EDU-
CATION 1985);
173. Oharenko, supra note 163.
174. Id. at 22.
175. Equity would allow a borrower who had defaulted to redeem his property
from the mortgagee by tendering the whole amount owed. That equitable right to re-
deem, the equity of redemption, continued until so much time had elapsed that it would
no longer be equitable to allow redemption. Because the outstanding equity of redemp-
tion would make the property unmarketable, equity would allow the lender to seek a
termination date from the court at which point the equity of redemption would be
foreclosed. Agreements ousting the equity court of its jurisdiction to grant redemption
were regarded with hostility and held invalid if they "clogged" the equity of redemp-
tion. See NELSON AND WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW §§ 3.1-3.2 (2d ed.
1985).
A mortgage in which the mortgagee has the option to purchase the mortgaged
property is not necessarily invalid as a clog on the equity of redemption. The decision
would turn on whether the parties intended to defeat the equity of redemption and
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the lender to foreclose on the mortgage rather than exercising the op-
tion. Unless the mortgage provides otherwise, that would probably pre-
vent the mortgagee's taking possession of the property until after fore-
closure. 76 Even if the mortgagee could take possession, it would be in a
precarious position, owing a fiduciary duty to the borrower, compared
to its position if it had been able to exercise the option and become the
owner.'
77
Even a borrower who is not in default may resist the lender's exer-
cising the option by claiming it is a disguised self-help foreclosure and
threaten the lender with protracted litigation. In addition, in those
states with statutory redemption periods following foreclosure, the
lender's period of danger would be extended by a borrower asserting a
right to redeem the property from the optionee. This problem may
cloud the title acquired by exercising the option, making the property
unmarketable. Consequently, the lender should avoid the convertible
mortgage format unless certain that the project will succeed.' 78
The acceptance of this method of financing may lead to pressure
upon state legislatures to eliminate the clogging problem. Legislation is
already beginning to appear. California has adopted a statute which
prevents an option from being held invalid as an impairment of the
equity of redemption if the right to exercise the option is not based on
the default on the mortgage and if the mortgage is for other than a one
to four unit residential property. 179 New York has adopted a statute
whether the lender used his superior bargaining position unfairly to acquire the right.
See Smith v. Smith, 82 N.H. 399, 135 A. 25 (1926); Barr v. Granahan, 255 Wis. 192,
38 N.W.2d 705 (1949); MacArthur v. North Palm Beach Utilities, Inc., 202 So. 2d
181 (Fla. 1967); Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Doerr, 123 N.J. Super. 530, 303 A.2d
898 (1973). See also Cooper-Hill and Slama, The Convertible Mortgage: Can It Be
Separated from the Clogging Rule?, 27 S. TEX. L. J. 407 (1986).
176. In most jurisdictions the mortgagee has only a lien, or some variation of a
lien, on the mortgaged property. Only in title theory states would the mortgagee have
the right to take possession upon default because in those states the mortgagor's right
to possession was granted contractually by the mortgage. See G. NELSON & D. WHIT-
MAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW §§ 4.1-4.3 (2d ed. 1985).
177. Id. at §§ 4.2-4.3.
178. Even this might not be enough to protect a pension fund from the charge
that it had violated the "prudent man" rule of ERISA by investing in the convertible
mortgage. Strawn, The Convertible Mortgage - Is it Really Convertible?, PENSION
WORLD February, 1982 at 37.
179. CAL. CIVIL CODE § 2906 (Deering 1986). This was sponsored by the Cali-
fornia Land Title Association and "obviates any concern about the 'clogging rule' for
purposes of the use of convertible mortgages in commercial transactions in California."
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which prevents the option from being held invalid for loans of at least
two and a half million dollars if the power to exercise the option is not
dependent on the mortgagor's default.1"'
Combining an option with a loan may produce another complica-
tion. Granting an option to purchase to the lender may be held to con-
stitute additional interest charged for the loan.'' The effect may be to
produce a usurious interest rate.' 82
If the option is given in partial consideration for the loan, the value
of the option-presumably its present discounted value-would in
most states be treated as additional interest. In most cases, the op-
tion value could be spread over the lesser of the term of the loan or
the option term, although in some states the option might be con-
sidered analogous to a bonus and the option value deducted from
the loan principal in order to measure the interest that can be law-
fully received.'
Whether the state still limits the amount of interest which may be
charged and the factors which would lead to the conclusion that the
loan is usurious should be carefully examined before drafting or execut-
ing such a loan. In many states usury may produce both criminal as
8 REAL PROP. LAW REP. 1, 4 (CALIFORNIA LEGAL EDUCATION 1985).
180. State of New York, 1985-86 Regular Session, S. 2710, A 3564, amending
General Obligations Law by adding section 5-334.
18 1. Roegge, Talbot and Zinman, Real Estate Equity Investments and the Insti-
tutional Lender: Nothing Ventured, Nothing Gained, 39 FORDHAM L. REV. 579, 624
(1971), points out the classic example of what may constitute interest by the case of
Vilas v. McBride, 17 N.Y.S. 171 (1891), affid, 136 N.Y. 634, 32 N.E. 1014 (1892),
holding that a mortgage loan was at a usurious rate because the value of manure to be
received by the mortgagee was treated as additional interest.
182. See, e.g. Regents of the University of California v. Sup. Ct. of Alameda
Cty., 17 Cal. 3d 533, 137 Cal. Rptr. 228, 551 P.2d 844 (1976), involving an option to
purchase an interest in oil royalties given in partial exchange for an apparently below
interest loan. See Siegman and Linquanti, The Convertible, Participating Mortgage:
Planning Opportunities and Legal Pitfalls in Structuring the Transaction, 54 U.
COLO. L. REV. 295, 326-338 (1983). See also Hershman, Usury and "New Look" in
Real Estate Financing, 4 REAL PROP. TR. L. J. 315 (1969); Respress, Equity Partici-
pation in Real Estate Finance, 7 N.C. CENT. L.J. 387 (1976); Cooke, Equity Participa-
tion in Texas: A Lender's Dream or a Usurious Nightmare, 34 Sw. L.J. (1980).
183. Nellis, Taking a Closer Look: Convertible Mortgages: A Brief Review of
the Legal and Drafting Issues, 8 REAL PROP. LAW REP. 1, 4 (Jan. 1985), citing
Cochran v. American Say. & Loan Ass'n, 568 S.W.2d 672 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978),
modified and affid, 568 S.W.2d 849 (Tex. 1979).
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well as civil liability.18' Moreover, avoiding the usury and clogging
problems does not immunize from the claim that the option is unen-
forceable because it is unconscionable.185
Unfortunately, trying to solve the usury and clogging problems
may cause undesirable side effects. 186 As one commentator pointed out:
The concerns about claims of usury and clogging of the equity of
redemption can be obviated if the transaction is structured as a
deferred sale to the lender of an equity position in the underlying
security. However, once bankruptcy and federal income tax consid-
erations are taken into account, such a characterization would un-
dercut some of the principal reasons for choosing the convertible
mortgage format in the first place. 187
If the borrower were to go into bankruptcy, the estate could reject
an executory contract, including an option. 8 If the drafter structured
the entire transaction to look like a contract for a deferred sale to avoid
the clogging and usury problems discussed above, that would certainly
be an executory contract which could be rejected and that structure
might mean that the lender would lose its status as a secured creditor
and the protection such status provides. 189 Even if the lender's secured
creditor status is not disturbed, its priority is not necessarily secure be-
cause the court can apply the doctrine of equitable subordination to
184. For example, in Florida, interest may not exceed 18% on loans not exceed-
ing $500,000. FLA. STAT. § 687.03 (1985). The civil penalty is the forfeiture of interest
not paid and double the interest actually paid. FLA. STAT. § 687.04 (1985). Willfully
and knowingly charging interest over 25% up to 45% is a second degree misdemeanor
and charging over 45% is a third degree felony; and, in addition, the principal as well
as the interest on such loans cannot be enforced in. the state's courts. FLA. STAT. §
687.071 (1985).
185. See Goldstein, Unconscionability: Some Reconsiderations with Particular
Reference to New-Type Mortgage Transactions, 17 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. L.J. 412
(1982); Kane, The Mortgagee's Option to Purchase Mortgaged Property, in FINANC-
ING REAL ESTATE DURING THE INFLATIONARY 80's, 123 (A.B.A. REAL PROP. PROB. &
TR. L. Sect. 198 1).
186. Mailer, Financing Ideas: Legal Concerns in Convertible Mortgage Transac-
tions, 13 REAL ESTATE L. J. 277, 284 (1984).
187. Id. at 281.
188. See § VI.G. infra for a general discussion of the Bankruptcy Code's appli-
cation to purchase options. A discussion of the Code's treatment of mortgages, and the
problems that may arise from a pre-bankruptcy foreclosure of the mortgage, would be
beyond the scope of this article.
189. See Mailer, supra note 186, at 281.
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subordinate all or part of the claim or interest. 190 Equally troubling to
the lender, is the buyer's exercising the option as much as a year before
the optionor's bankruptcy could possibly be set aside as voidable prefer-
ence or even a fraudulent transfer. 19'
The final concern is the loss of the tax benefits which the converti-
ble mortgage structure was intended to provide. The I.R.S. may assert
that the loan is really a capital contribution from a partner or co-ven-
turer and that the true nature of the transaction is a partnership be-
tween the lender and borrower, creating income tax. 92 Although draft-
ing strategies have been suggested to minimize the risks discussed
above,198 under the current law, safely structuring a convertible mort-
gage is a difficult and risky task" 4 justified only in a large, secure and
potentially very profitable project.
V. Problems with Purchase Options
A. Transfer
The rights of the optionee may be transferred and the obligations
of the optionor may bind those to whom the optioned land has been
transferred. The question of whether that has happened is primarily a
question of the intent of the parties to the option. However, the prob-
190. Bankruptcy Code of 1978, II U.S.C. §501(c). See Siegman and Linquanti,
The Convertible, Participating Mortgage: Planning Opportunities and Legal Pitfalls in
Structuring the Transaction, 54 U. COLO. L. REV. 295, 321-326 (1983). See also
Seneker and Lewis, Selected Bankruptcy Aspects of Real Estate Partnerships and Hy-
brid Debt-Equity Arrangements, Chapter X in REAL ESTATE BANKRUPTCIES AND
WORKOUTS: A PRACTICAL PROSPECTIVE, (ABA Section of Real Property, Probate and
Trust Law 1983).
191. These are discussed briefly in § V.E. infra.
192. For example, the transaction may be recharacterized as a partnership
rather than as a mortgage. See Steuben, The Convertible, Participating Mortgage;
Federal Income Tax Considerations, 54 U. COLO. L. REV. 237 (1983). In addition, if
the mortgage interest rate is significantly below market rate in partial consideration of
the option, the I.R.S. might attempt to impute and levy tax upon a higher interest rate.
193. Siegman and Linquanti, supra note 190, at 358-370.
194. See Kane, A Case for Convertible Mortgages, reprinted from the New
York Law Journal (May 13, 1985) in Creative Real Estate Financing 1986, PRACTIC-
ING LAW INSTITUTE, 279 Real Estate Law and Practice Course Handbook Series
(1986), advocating that state legislatures should act to eliminate the obstacles to lend-
ers utilizing convertible mortgage financing. See also The Convertible Mortgage - Is it
really convertible? PENSION WORLD 37 (February, 1982), suggesting shared apprecia-
tion mortgages as a preferable financing vehicle.
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lem usually faced in litigation is how to interpret the option where the
parties failed to express their intent. Moreover, for an option to bind
the successors to the land, it must meet the requirements, in addition to
the parties intent, of any covenant whose burden runs with the land.195
Ordinarily, an optionee would be unlikely to bargain for a right
which could be defeated by the sale to another and so the option should
be presumed binding on the optionor's successors unless otherwise
agreed. Likewise, a right of first refusal would be binding against a
transferee unless the right had been waived, extinguished by the failure
to exercise it after it had been triggered by an offer, or extinguished by
an involuntary sale. The parties could even agree that a right of first
refusal would be enforceable against the transferee whose offer would
have triggered the preemptive right.196
Absent agreement to the contrary, land subject to an option is
freely alienable until the option has been exercised.1 97 While an at-
tempt to absolutely prohibit the transfer of the property would be inva-
lid as a restraint on alienation, " a reasonable prohibition would be
upheld. A very common example is the condominium rules which re-
quire that prospective purchasers be approved by the association and,
in the event of disapproval, the association has the right for itself or for
another purchaser it has proffered to preempt the offeror. These have
been upheld if not applied unreasonably or arbitrarily. 99
Where the optionor attempts to convey the property in violation of
the optionee's rights, the court of equity may enjoin the sale, order the
optionor's contract with the third party rescinded, and decree specific
performance for the optionee. 00 If the optionor has already transferred
195. See Stoebuck, Running Covenants, An Analytical Primer, 52 WASH. L.
REv. 861 (1977).
196. See, e.g., Texaco, Inc. v. Creel, 310 N.C. 695, 314 S.E.2d 506 (1984); Rob-
binson v. Central Properties, Inc., 468 So. 2d 986 (Fla. 1985), although the survivor-
ship of the right of first refusal was not a contested issue in either case.
197. See Annotation, Option To Purchase Real Property As Affected By Op-
tionor's Receipt Of Offer For, Or Sale Of, Larger Tract Which Includes The Optioned
Parcel, 34 A.L.R.4th 1217 (1984).
198. See the discussion of the Rule Against Restraints on Alienation in § VI.F.
supra.
199. Lyons v. King, 397 So. 2d 964 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1981). See Annota-
tion, Validity, Construction, and Application of Statutes, or of Condominium Associa-
tion's Bylaws or Regulations, Restricting Sale, Transfer, or Lease of Condominium
Units, 17 A.L.R.4th 1247 (1982).
200. S.B.R.'s Restaurant, Ltd. v. Towey, 515 N.Y.S.2d 573 (App. Div. 1987),
where the right involved was a right of first refusal included in a lease.
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the property, the optionee could obtain specific performance against the
transferee, forcing him to convey the property to the optionee.2 01 The
optionee may also be able to obtain damages from the breaching op-
tionor 20 2 and against a third party who has tortiously interfered with
his contract rights under the option. 3
Where the transferee does not have notice of the option or right of
first refusal and has paid value,20' he may take title free of the burden
so it may not be asserted against him.205 An example is Bonded Invest-
ment and Realty Company v. Waksman.20 The original buyer had
taken title subject to the developer's unrecorded option to repurchase if
construction on a house was not commenced within three years. The
buyers from the original purchaser took by a contract which recited
that "Buyer has been informed that construction must be commenced
by May 1, 1981" but there was nothing in the records about the option
nor were they ever informed about it. The developer subsequently
sought specific performance of the reconveyance option. The court held
that absent notice the buyers were not bound by the option and the
recital did not put them on inquiry, that is, they had no duty to inquire
further about it.
The usual, but not the only, manner of giving notice to potential
subsequent buyers is by recording the option in the appropriate public
records."' However, under most recording schemes, the prospective
201. See § VI. B. infra.
202. See Annotation, Tenant's Right to Damages for Landlord's Breach of Ten-
ant's Option to Purchase, 17 A.L.R.3d 976 (1968).
203. Young v. Pottinger, 340 So. 2d 518 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1976). But see
Gross v. Lowder Realty Better Homes and Gardens, 494 So. 2d 590 (Ala. 1986).
204. That is, where he is a good faith or bona fide purchaser for value.
205. See Annotation, What Constitutes Notice To Subsequent Purchaser of
Real Property Of Option To Purchase Contained In Unrecorded Lease, 17 A.L.R.2d
331 (1951).
Even though a contract may be valid, it may be unrecordable if not executed in
accordance with the state's recording statute. See, e.g. FLA. STAT. § 696.01 (1985),
which prohibits recording any contract to sell land in Florida unless the contract is
acknowledged in the same manner as a deed. Absent recording, the contract of sale is
ineffective against a good faith purchaser for valuable consideration without notice.
FLA. STAT. § 695.01 (1985).
206. 437 So. 2d 162 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
207. See generally R. BOYER, SURVEY OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY Chapter XX-
Iii (2d ed. 1981); J. CRIBBET, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY ch. 6, § 3 (2d ed.
1975); R. CUNNINGHAM, STOEBUCK AND WHITMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY §§ 11.9-
11.10 (1984).
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purchaser may be put on notice by other means. Being informed di-
rectly by the optionor, the optionee or someone else would be sufficient
because it is actual notice.208 Similarly, if someone other than the seller
is in possession, such as a lessee, a prospective purchaser is put on no-
tice that the possessor may have some rights to the property and the
prospective purchaser has a duty to inquire to discover the extent of
those rights. The purchaser would be charged with notice of those in-
terests which he would have discovered if he had inquired.209 If the
lessee also has an option or a right of first refusal, the transferee who
had inquiry notice of it would take subject to it.210
An option may give the optionee an independent right or may in-
clude that right as part of another transaction or conveyance. An inde-
pendent option can be assigned like any other contract right, but it is
presumed that the parties intended the option to be nontransferable.21
If the option is included in a conveyance, it can be assigned separately
from the conveyance only if it was intended to be personal. Ordinarily,
absent agreement to the contrary, the presumption exists that a
purchase option or right of first refusal, except if appearing in a
lease, 212 lasts only during the lives of the parties.2 3
Although the presumption against assignability does not apply to a
lease-option, it is presumed that such options cannot be assigned sepa-
rately from the leasehold.21" Absent a manifestation that the parties
intended that the lessee's purchase option would be personal to him, his
208. Only in a jurisdiction with a pure race recording statute would actual notice
of an unrecorded option be insufficient to make the option effective against the subse-
quent purchaser. See POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 905(1)(a).
209. See Id. at § 905(2).
210. Denco, Inc. v. Belk, 97 So. 2d 261 (Fla. 1957).
211. Shower v. Fischer, 47 Wash. App. 720, 737 P.2d 291 (1987), relying on 6
AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 26.67, at 984 (1977 Supp.). But see Adams v. Stoffer,
69 So. 2d 884 (Fla. 1954).
212. Randolph v. Koury Corp., 312 S.E.2d 759 (W. Va. 1984). See Annotation,
Right of Assignee or Sublessee to Enforce Option Contained in Lease for Purchase of
Property, 45 A.L.R.2d 1034 (1956).
213. Shower v. Fischer, 47 Wash. App. 720, 737 P.2d 291 (1987), citing, Lantis
v. Cook, 342 Mich. 347, 69 N.W.2d 849 (1955); Kerschner v. Hulburt, 277 S.W.2d
619 (Mo. 1955); Roemhild v. Jones, 239 F.2d 492 (8th Cir. 1957); and 6 AMERICAN
LAW OF PROPERTY § 26.67, at 1984 (1977 Supp.).
214. Gilbert v. Van Kleeck, 284 A.D. 611, 132 N.Y.S.2d 580 (1954). See Anno-
tation, Who May Enforce Option Contained In Lease For Purchase Of Property, 38
A.L.R. 1162 (1965); Annotation, Right Of Assignee Or Sublessee To Enforce Option
Contained In Lease For Purchase Of Property, 45 A.L.R.2d 1034 (1956).
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assignment" 5 of his lease would deprive him of the ability to exercise
the option.21 Only the assignee could exercise it. A sublease, in con-
trast to an assignment,2 17 would not transfer the option to the subten-
ant. It leaves the sublessor, not the subtenant, with the right to exercise
the option. 8 Similarly, where buyers under an installment contract as-
signed all their rights under the contract and to the land, only the as-
signee would be able to exercise the right of first refusal contained in
the contract. 9
The optionor must be notified of the assignment before the option
can be exercised by the assignee.22 0 The optionor cannot refuse to per-
form the assigned option unless the assignment is void; that the option
would be voidable would not excuse his performance. 2 However, ab-
sent estoppel, an assignee stands in no better position than the original
optionee.222
215. "Assignment of a lease" is a term of art used to signify that the assignor
has transferred his entire leasehold to the assignee. The original tenant who has as-
signed no longer has any interest in the land. Consequently, any rights which flow from
his prior estate in the land, e.g., the benefits of any covenant which runs with the land,
would pass with the leasehold to the assignee.
216. L & M Corporation v. Loader, 688 P.2d 448 (Utah 1984); Moore & Mc-
Caleb, Inc. v. Gaines, 489 So. 2d 491 (Miss. 1986).
217. A "sublease" means that the tenant has conveyed, or sub-leased, part but
not all of his interest to a subtenant, in contrast to an assignment which would involve
a transfer of all of the tenant's estate. Because the subtenant does not acquire the
entire interest of his grantor, the original tenant, becomes his landlord. The original
tenant because he still has a leasehold interest, is in a contractual and tenurial relation-
ship with the landowner who is his landlord. The subtenant has no relationship with the
landowner because his landlord is the original tenant.
218. See Annotation, Right Of Assignee Or Sublessee To Enforce Option Con-
tained In Lease For Purchase Of Property, 45 A.L.R.2d 1034 (1956); Annotation,
Who May Enforce Option Contained In Lease For Purchase Of Property, 38 A.L.R.
1162 (1925).
219. See, e.g., Barnhart v. McKinney, 235 Kan. 511, 682 P.2d 112 (1984), but
note that the assignees there also obtained the seller's consent to the assignment and by
her later conduct the seller acknowledged the validity of the assignment.
220. Melton v. Michigan Trust Co., 93 Fla. 645, I11 So. 513 (1927).
221. Randolph v. Koury Corporation, 312 S.E.2d 759 (W. Va. 1984).
222. Goodman v. Goodman, 290 So. 2d 552 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1973) (an
option which failed to include material terms had produced no meeting of the minds
and could not be enforced by the optionee's assignee as that would not produce a
contract).
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B. The Rules Against Perpetuities and Restraints on
Alienation
Historically the Rule Against Perpetuities was considered applica-
ble to purchase options22 and to preemptive rights.224 As viewed from
the time it was executed, an option which could possibly still tie up the
land after the passing of the lives in being plus twenty-one years would
be void. 2 5 For example, an option to purchase land within 120 days of
the city's acquisition of land for two new highways was held to violate
the rule. The optionee was a corporate entity and no reference had
been made in the option to any life or lives in being, so the measuring
period was 21 years. There existed the clear possibility that the exercise
of the option might occur after the prescribed period. Consequently,
the option was void ab initio.22'
The theory is that an option, if exercised, would give the optionee
an equitable estate. Before it is exercised, the option is similar to a
future equitable estate which could spring out of the owner at an indef-
inite time in the future, a mere possibility, contingent upon the
grantee's whim, which might vest at a remote time in the future. This
would seem to be exactly the type of contingent interest, i.e., a contin-
223. Kershner v. Hurlburt, 277 S.W.2d 619 (Mo. 1955). See Powell, ON REAL
PROPERTY 771; Berg, Long-Term Options and the Rule Against Perpetuities, 37 CAL.
L. REV. (Part 1) 1-37, (Part 11) 235-268, (Part 11) 419-454 (1949); Langeluttig, Op-
tions To Purchase And The Rule Against Perpetuities, 17 VA. L. REV. 461 (1931);
Annotation, Independent Option To Purchase Real Estate As Violating Rule Against
Perpetuities Or Restraints On Alienation, 66 A.L.R.3d 1294 (1975). See also dicta in
Inglehart v. Phillips, 383 So. 2d 610, 614 (Fla. 1980).
But see Warren v. City of Leesburg, 203 So. 2d 522, 526 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App,
1967), where the court stated in dicta that: "the weight of authority holds that a mere
option to purchase land (or repurchase land) does not vest the holder . . . with any
interest. . . . Such is strictly a contractual right, not a property right, while the rule
against perpetuities is a rule of property rather than a rule of contract."
224. See Annotation, Pre-emptive Rights To Realty As Violation Of Rule
Against Perpetuities or Rule Concerning Restraints On Alienation, 40 A.L.R.3d 920
(1971); Annotation, Independent Option To Purchase Real Estate As Violating Rule
Against Perpetuities Or Restraints On Alienation, 66 A.L.R.3d 1294 (1975).
225. Barnhart v. McKinney, 235 Kan. 511, 682 P.2d 112 (1984).
226. United Virginia Bank/Citizens & Marine v. Union Oil Company of Cali-
fornia, 214 Va. 48, 197 S.E.2d 174, 66 A.L.R.3d 1286 (1973), which also held that the
doctrine of cy pres would not be available to avoid the application of the Rule Against
Perpetuities. See also Certified Corp., v. GTE Products Corporation, 392 Mass. 821,
467 N.E.2d 1336 (1984), where an in gross twenty five year option to purchase met a
similar fate.
[Vol. 12
Real Estate Purchase Options
gent remainder or a shifting or springing interest, 2 7 which the Rule
Against Perpetuities was intended to limit. But the rule did not apply
to future interests retained by the grantor, for example, a possibility of
reverter, the right, of re-entry or a reversion. 28 The logical application
of this exception should result in the rule not applying to options re-
tained by the grantor, but courts have not reached that conclusion.22 9
Application of the rule has been frequently avoided, revealing a
judicial distaste for its effects. Whenever possible, it seems courts inter-
pret the option so as to uphold the validity of the option.230 For exam-
ple, the Kansas Supreme Court, despite the fact that the option speci-
fied that it bound the heirs, executors, administrators and assigns of the
respective parties, construed an option to repurchase in the event that
the buyers ever decided to self as personal to the optionees.28 It could
not last for more than their lives and so could not remain contingent
beyond the proscribed lives in being plus twenty one years.2 32 In an-
227. See MOYNIHAN, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY, Ch. 9, §
10 (1962); Bergin and Haskell, Preface to Estates in Land and Future Interests, Ch. 8
(1984); SIMES, LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS, Part V (2d ed., 1966).
228. See, e.g., Emerson v. King, 118 N.H. 684, 394 A.2d 51 (1978) where the
court characterized the grantee's title as being a fee simple defeasible subject to the
purchase option. The court did not discuss whether the Rule Against Perpetuities
would be inapplicable, concluding instead that the requirements of the Rule had been
satisfied because the option must vest in time.
229. See, e.g., Broach v. City of Hampton, 283 Ark. 496, 677 S.W.2d 851
(1984).
230. See, e.g., Crawford v. Deshotels, 359 So. 2d 118 (La. 1978), narrowly con-
struing the statutory prohibition against options which do not contain express time lim-
itations as not applying to rights of first refusal. See also Brauer v. Hobbs, 151 Mich.
App. 769, 391 N.W.2d 482 (1986), interpreting the Rule to require that in the absence
of a specific time limit courts should construe the option or right of first refusal to be
for a reasonable time rather than holding it to be void.
Conversely, the policy behind the Rule indicates that courts should narrowly con-
strue options and preemptive rights. See RESTATEMENT, SECOND, PROPERTY § 4.4,
comments c and d and Introductory Note to Part 11; 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §
26.66.
231. Barnhart v. McKinney, 235 Kan. 511, 682 P.2d 112 (1984). See also
Kershner v. Hurlburt, 277 S.W.2d 619, 623 (Mo. 1955), where a similar construction
was reached relying on the facts that the contract did not specify that heirs and assigns
would be bound by it, nor include any indication that the parties intended that it ex-
tend beyond their respective lives. See also Layne v. Henderson, 232 Va. 332, 351
S.E.2d 18 (1986), interpreting a mutual buy-out option to the survivor or survivors of
three co-purchasers to be exercisable only by one of the original parties during his
lifetime.
232. Similar logic was used in Broach v. City of Hampton, 283 Ark. 496, 677
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other example, the Georgia Supreme Court upheld an option which ex-
tended ninety days beyond the death of the survivor of the two tenants,
and provided that the ninety days did not begin to run until the op-
tionee was notified of the death. The court held that a reasonable time
was to be implied which could not exceed twenty one years.2 33
The policy behind the Rule Against Perpetuities may be frustrated
by the complexity in its application. The value of options to the real
estate business may not outweigh the policy behind the Rule, but the
interests can be harmonized by simple time limits which would not in-
validate the option ab initio. Some state legislatures have responded.
One has exempted options and rights of first refusal from the Rule's
coverage, but simultaneously placed a forty year limit on the duration
of such rights in gross234 except where other specific exceptions have
been found justified, for example, reasonable restrictions on the trans-
fer of a condominium unit by the condominium association's rights of
first refusal.2 5 Another state has taken the approach of limiting the
duration of options, except for repurchase options and options con-
tained in leases, 6 to twenty years, but making those without an ex-
press duration unenforceable after two years.2 7 Furthermore, to pre-
vent recorded, but unexercised, options from clouding the titles, it
provides that a recorded option no longer provides notice of the op-
tionee's rights if one year has elapsed from the point of expiration, re-
newal or extension without any notice being recorded that the option
S.W.2d 851 (1984), to conclude that the city's option to repurchase, if it needed the
land for the sewer system, would extend only for the lives of the optionees.
233. Young v. Cass, 255 Ga. 508, 340 S.E.2d 185, 186 (1986).
234. FLA. STAT. § 689.22(3)(a)7 (1985). "Options to purchase in gross or in a
lease or preemptive rights in the nature of a right of first refusal, but no option in gross
is valid for more than 40 years, from the date of its creation." However, it is appropri-
ate to note that there are options which are neither in gross nor in a lease and, conse-
quently, not within the specific language of this statute. In addition, the 40 year limit
only applies to options in gross. Therefore, options running with the land apparently
may have an unlimited duration. It would also appear that rights of first refusal could
have an unlimited duration under this statute. However, a right of first refusal is an
option which is subject to a condition precedent. Consequently, the exception for op-
tions should include rights of first refusal because they are a sub-category of options.
235. FLA. STAT. § 718.104(5) (1985).
236. ALA. CODE § 35-4-76(a) (1975). The limitation further requires that the
option contained in the lease must be exercisable not later than the end of the term of
the lease to qualify for the exception.
237. ALA. CODE § 35-4-76(a) (1975).
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has been exercised 238 unless the optionee is in possession of the land.23"
Other societal needs may outweigh the policy behind the Rule
where the parties are commercial or governmental entities. Noting that
the lack of a human measuring life reduces the applicable period to
twenty-one years, the New York Court of Appeals pointed out that, the
Rule, which is aimed at remote vesting, is really the wrong rule to test
the validity of preemptive rights of unlimited duration because it is too
inflexible. Such options impose only a minor impediment to free trans-
ferability of land while preventing legitimate transactions. Applying the
Rule Against Perpetuities to them would undermine its purpose, the
encouragement of the use and development of property. 4 0 The appro-
priate test for validity should be the Rule Against Unreasonable Re-
straints on Alienation.
The Rule Against Restraints on Alienation, however, does have an
inflexible aspect in that it prohibits direct restraints which disable the
landowner from conveying or which provide for a forfeiture in the event
of conveyance," 1 but its flexible aspect is illustrated by Inglehart v.
Philips," 2 a case which came to the Florida Supreme Court on a certi-
fied question from the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit. It asked whether a seller's right of first refusal for an unlimited
time, at a purchase price determined not by the preempted offer but
fixed at the buyer's original cost plus the cost of improvements, and for
no other purpose than consideration had been given was void or unen-
forceable.2' 3 The case was decided based upon the common law Rule
Against Restraints on Alienation, never reaching the perpetuities
question.2 "'
238. ALA. CODE § 35-4-76(b) (1975).
239. ALA. CODE § 35-4-76(c) (1975).
240. Metropolitan Transportation Authority v. Bruken Realty Corporation, 67
N.Y.2d 156, 492 N.E.2d 379, 384 (1986), holding that the rule against remote vesting,
e.g., the Rule Against Perpetuities, would not be applicable where the parties were a
State authority and a national transportation corporation.
241. Broach v. City of Hampton, 283 Ark. 496, 677 S.W.2d 851, 855 (1984).
242. Inglehart v. Phillips, 383 So. 2d 610, 611 (Fla. 1980).
243. See Phillips v. Inglehart, 626 F.2d 393 (5th Cir. 1980), where the United
States Court of Appeals applied the answers provided by the Florida Supreme Court.
244. Inglehart v. Phillips, 383 So. 2d at 617. The Rule Against Restraints on
Alienation has consistently been applied to rights of first refusal as well as to purchase
options. See, e.g., Colen v. Patterson, 436 So. 2d 182 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1983);
See also Annotation, Pre-emptive Rights To Realty As Violation Of Rule Against
Perpetuities or Rule Concerning Restraints On Alienation, 40 A.L.R.3d 920 (1971);
Annotation, Independent Option To Purchase Real Estate As Violating Rule Against
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The court pointed out that the distinction between the rules is that
the Rule Against Restraints on Alienation is really a rule against un-
reasonable restraints,24 5 the focus being on duration, while the Rule
Against Perpetuities is concerned with the remoteness of interests vest-
ing. Consequently, in applying the former, "[t]he test which should be
applied with respect to restraints on alienation is the test of reasonable-
ness. . .[it] depends upon its long-term effect on the improvement and
marketability of property. Once that effect is determined, common
sense should dictate whether it is reasonable or unreasonable." 2"
Generally an option is considered reasonable ". . . if the option
price is at market or appraised value, irrespective of the duration of the
option. 24 7 If not in a lease, an option of unlimited duration at a fixed
price is an unreasonable restraint 48 because it would discourage the
owner from improving the property. In contrast, such an option held by
a lessee would encourage him to improve the property. Because that
option would discourage improvements, it was held invalid as an unrea-
sonable restraint on alienation.24 9
The Missouri Supreme Court applied the Rule Against Restraint
on Alienation in a similar fashion in dealing with a provision which
gave the seller the right to repurchase the property at a fixed price if
the buyers ever decided to sell in violation of the rule.2 50 The provision
did not specifically prohibit alienation, but as a practical matter, the
court reasoned, the provision would prevent the owner from ever selling
it if the land increased in value. Thus the restraint was "substantial"
and violated the rule.25 1
Perpetuities Or Restraints On Alienation, 66 A.L.R.3d 1294 (year).
245. Phillips supra at note 242. Even where not referring to the Rule Against
Restraints on Alienation, courts hold that an option must be exercised within a reason-
able time. See. e.g., Snyder v. Bowen, 359 Pa. Super. 47, 518 A.2d 558, 561 (1986),
upholding, because not unreasonable, the exercise thirteen years after entry of a
purchase option contained in a partnership agreement.
246. Phillips, supra at note 242, 383 So. 2d at 614.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 615. The option in this case set the purchase price at the optionor's
purchase price plus the cost of improvements, a formula which effectively denied the
optionor compensation for improvements or appreciation and which the court consid-
ered to be the equivalent of a fixed price option.
249. Id. at 616. Note that the court also concluded that the deed containing the
right of first refusal should not be cancelled or rescinded but that equitable relief would
be appropriate.
250. Kershner v. Hurlburt, 277 S.W.2d 619 (Mo. 1955).
251. Id.; But see Barnhart v. McKinney, 235 Kan. 511, 682 P.2d 112, 121
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C. Characterization as a Mortgage
An option to purchase property may be involved with the loan of
money in two different ways which may invite a court to limit its appli-
cation by characterizing it as a mortgage which must be foreclosed.
The lender may be given the option to purchase, being the threat that
the option will be exercised unless the loan repaid. This situation was
discussed in the earlier section on convertible mortgages.2 52 The topic
of this section is the opposite situation, where the borrower conveys his
land to the lender but retains an option to repurchase.
This transaction may represent the parties intent that the seller
have the free choice to repurchase the land at some time in the future.
However, this transaction might involve a loan to the optionee who, as
the former owner, is coerced into repaying the loan by the threat that
he will lose his land if the option expires without being exercised by
repayment.2 5 8 What purported to be the purchase of the land was re-
ally transfer of the land for the purpose of securing the repayment of
the amount loaned and that the payment of the option price is really
repayment of the loan. Failure to exercise the option is really default
on the loan.
This may be illustrated by the recent case of Rice v. Wood.2 "5 The
homeowner was in danger of losing his home because he was behind in
(1984), in which a right of first refusal, granted to buyers of neighboring land under an
installment contract, at the fixed price of $200 per acre was upheld as not unreasonable
after considering that the seller offered the land for $1000 per acre, the installment
contract was entered into fairly, and the other provisions had been adhered to by the
parties. See also Brooks v. Terteling, 107 Idaho 262, 688 P.2d 1167 (1984), upholding
a similar option and right of first refusal as not unconscionable, but not considering the
Rule Against Restraints on Alienation.
252. See supra § IV.D.
253. -The term includes a sale subject to contract to reconvey as well as a sale
subject to an option to repurchase. The operative effect is the same. The "buyer" re-
ceives title and is obligated to reconvey only if the "seller" pays the contract or option
price for reconveyance. If the intent of the parties was to obligate the "seller" to repay
the amount he had received (plus interest) and secure that obligation with the property,
then the sale was really a loan and the option is really a disguised mortgage. Con-
versely, if the parties did not intend to bind the "seller" to repay, then the transaction
is a conditional sale. It seems obvious that an option to repurchase is less likely to be
characterized as a mortgage that is an executory contract to reconvey because, by defi-
nition, the optionee is not obligated to do anything. He has free choice. However, a
nonrecourse mortgage would produce the same event. See Nelson and Whitman, REAL
ESTATE FINANCE LAW, Ch. 3 (1985).
254. Rice v. Wood, 82 N.C. App. 318, 346 S.E.2d 205 (1986).
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his mortgage payments. He was approached by a real estate agent with
a plan to solve his problems. The agent arranged for the landowner to
sell his home to investors who would assume the mortgage, rent the
home back to him and give him an eighteen month option to repur-
chase. When the former owner fell behind in the rent, the investors
brought a summary ejectment. That was when the former owner first
sought legal help, tried to exercise the option, and counterclaimed to
have the option treated as a mortgage. The court held that the factors
to be considered revealed that the option might, in fact, be a mortgage.
When the documents do not affirmatively show that the parties in-
tended a mortgage, the burden shifts to the optionee to show that a
mortgage was intended. The factors here would be sufficient to demon-
strate, for example, that the optionee remained in possession after the
conveyance, the optionee paid as rent the amount due on the first mort-
gage, the price paid for the conveyance was not the fair market value
of the land but rather the grantees' costs from the transaction and was
less than half of the fair market value, the option price was figured as
the optionor's costs plus profit, and the negotiations began by the for-
mer owners seeking a loan, not a sale. The court pointed out that the
requirement that there be a debt which the land was to secure did not
mean that there must be a personal obligation on which the optionor
could recover a deficiency judgment in the event that the option was
not exercised. 55
A development may legitimately be structured using a sale to a
buyer who leases the property back to the borrower. That way, rather
than be a lender with only a mortgage on the property, the buyer be-
comes the owner of the property, secure in his ownership and enjoying
the other benefits of ownership such as the tax benefit of being able to
deduct depreciation. The seller is now a lessee who makes rental pay-
ments which, if an ordinary business expense, are also deductible rather
than mortgage payments where deductibility is limited to the interest
paid. But, if the lease includes a repurchase option which allows the
seller to reacquire the property by paying back to the buyer an amount
(plus interest) which the buyer had earlier paid to him, it begins to
look suspiciously like a loan secured by a mortgage.
The effect of a court determining that the option should be treated
as a mortgage could be substantial. The failure to exercise such an
255. Id. 346 S.E. 2d at 210. However, the trial court made a crucial error in
failing to instruct the jury that it must find that a debt existed which the land was
intended to secure. Consequently, a new trial was ordered.
[Vol. 12
Real Estate Purchase Options
option would amount to a default on the mortgage. A defaulting mort-
gagee has an equity of redemption, allowing it to redeem the property
by paying off the obligation. The equity of redemption may be exer-
cised until foreclosed and many states require that the foreclosure be
by judicial proceedings, 25' and even those that do not require judicial
proceedings still require certain nbtices and procedures to make the
nonjudicial foreclosure effective. Consequently, if the option is charac-
terized as a mortgage, the expiration of the option would not terminate
all the optionee's rights. Even if time is specified as being of the essence
in exercising the option, the defaulting mortgagee could go into equity
and redeem, in effect exercising the expired option, until the optionee's
rights have been affirmatively foreclosed or until the equities are no
longer on the side of the mortgagor due to laches or estoppel. In addi-
tion, some states provide by statute for an additional period of redemp-
tion following the foreclosure of the equity of redemption, 2 5  further
elongating the duration of the optionee's rights.
D. Bankruptcy
Where the optionor has entered bankruptcy, new issues arise.
Under the Bankruptcy Code,2"8 the debtor's executory contracts259 and
unexpired leases2 60 may be rejected. An option is arguably an execu-
256. For example, Florida by statute requires all mortgages be judicially fore-
closed, FLA. STAT. § 702.01 (1985), and further provides that any instrument having
the purpose or intent of securing the payment of money shall be deemed to be a mort-
gage. FLA. STAT. § 697.01 (1985). However, in Rosenthal v. LeMay, 72 So. 2d 289
(Fla. 1954), the court held that the parties to an option did not intend a mortgage. The
court considered the testimony of the participants, that the buyer-optionor did not want
to make a loan, that both parties were represented by able counsel who characterized
the transaction as an option rather than a mortgage, that the sale price was $40,000 for
an interest worth more than $100,000, and that the option price was arrived at by
crediting the optionor with the estimated rent less the equivalent interest.
257. This is referred to as Statutory Redemption in contrast to the Equity of
Redemption. See Nelson and Whitman, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW §§ 7.1, 8.4-8.8
(2d Ed. 1985).
258. II U.C.C. (Bankruptcy).
259. See Cherkis and King, COLLIER REAL ESTATE TRANSACTION AND THE
BANKRUPTCY CODE § 365.03.
260. See generally Cherkis and King, supra note 259, at § 365. It seems that an
option contained in the rejected lease would be terminated by such rejection absent an
intent by the parties that it be severable from the lease, Cherkis and King, supra, §
4.02(3).
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tory contract which may be rejected under this provision.2 6' Clearly,
once the option has been exercised it becomes an executory contract
which may be rejected. Consequently, the optionee may be deprived of
the opportunity to purchase the optioned land, being left with only the
monetary claim against the estate.
A purchaser in possession undei an executory contract which has
been rejected has the right to remain in possession, complete the pay-
ments required by the contract with setoffs for damages caused by the
rejection, and receive the title on completion. 62 It is unlikely that an
optionee will be in possession of the premises under any option other
than a lease-option, and a lessee in possession under a rejected lease is
already protected by another provision. He may remain in possession
for the balance of the term, renew the lease, and enforce the lease
terms, apparently including the purchase option. 63
An optionor may seek the protection of bankruptcy as a way to
escape from an option which he thinks is a bad deal. That occurred in
In re Waldron2" which involved a voluntary Chapter 13 petition. The
optionee had filed an objection to the debtor-optionor's proposed Chap-
ter 13 plan. The Eleventh Circuit held that a financially secure hus-
band and wife could not utilize Chapter 13 solely for the purpose of
escaping an option which had turned out to be less profitable than they
had hoped. That was bad faith and an abuse of Chapter 13 requiring
dismissal of the petition.
That the option has been exercised or the transfer under the option
completed prior to the filing of the bankruptcy is no guaranty that the
optionee will not be affected. Exercising the option or transferring the
property as much as a year before the optionor's bankruptcy could pos-
sibly be set aside as voidable preference265 or even a fraudulent trans-
261. Cherkis and King, supra note 259 at § 365(a).
262. 11 U.S.C. § 365(i) (1982). For a more detailed discussion of the Bank-
ruptcy law, see L. CHERKIS, and King, Supra note 259, especially § 4.02 on options.
See also Pedowitz, The Effect of Bankruptcy or Insolvency on Real Estate Transac-
tions-An Overview, 20 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. L. J. 25 (1985).
263. 11 U.S.C. § 365(h) (1982). See CHERKIS, and King, Supra note 259, §
4.02(3).
264. 785 F.2d 936 (11th Cir. 1986), cert. dismissed, 106 S. Ct. 3343 (1986).
265. To be set aside as a voidable preference, under 11 U.S.C. 547 (1982), the
transfer must have been made (1) to or for the benefit of a creditor; (2) for or on
account of an antecedent debt owed by the debtor before such transfer was made; (3)
made while the debtor was insolvent and the debtor is presumed to have been insolvent
on and during the 90 days immediately preceding the filing of the petition; (4) made on
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fer 266 if the option price was substantially less than the market value.
However, a transfer to a good faith purchaser for value could not be set
aside to the extent of the value paid.267 The Bankruptcy Code also al-
lows transfers to be set aside under state fraudulent conveyance laws 68
and the state law may not be limited to transfers which took place
within the one year prior to the bankruptcy filing.26 9
E. Title Defects
The quality of the title to be conveyed is a serious consideration in
a land sale contract. Nearly every modern contract is explicitly condi-
tioned on the seller's ability to deliver marketable title and also re-
quires that the seller use good faith or best efforts to make the title
marketable. An option to purchase should specify if the contract of sale
which will be formed if the option is exercised will include these
terms, 270 because in the absence of a contrary expression, they will
probably be found to have been implied. Such term gives the buyer/
or within 90 days before filing of the bankruptcy petition, or between 90 days and one
year before the filing if the creditor was an insider at the time of the transfer; (5) that
enables the creditor to receive more than it would under a chapter 7 liquidation or if
the transfer had not been made. See Cook, Preferences Under the Bankruptcy Code,
and Seneker and Lewis, Selected Bankruptcy Aspects of Real Estate Partnerships and
Hybrid Debt-Equity Arrangements, in Real Estate Bankruptcies and Workouts,
(A.B.A. SEc. OF REAL PROP., PROB. AND TR. L. 1983).
266. To be set aside as a fraudulent transfer, under I I U.S.C. § 548 (1982) the
transfer must have been made, or the obligation incurred, within one year before the
filing of the bankruptcy petition and (I) made with the intent of hindering, delaying or
defrauding any of the debtor's creditors; or (2) the debtor received less than a reasona-
bly equivalent value in exchange and the debtor was insolvent or became insolvent
because of the exchange or the exchange left it with an unreasonably small capital or
which was made with the belief or intent that the debtor would incur debts beyond its
ability to pay.
267. As a voidable preference under I I U.S.C. § 547(c) (1982), or a fraudulent
transfer under II U.S.C. § 544(b) (1982).
268. II U.S.C. § 544(b) (1982).
269. See, e.g., In re Copter Inc., 19 B.R. 588 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1982) which is
provided as an example by Seneker and Lewis, Selected Bankruptcy Aspects of Real
Estate Partnerships and Hybred Debt-Equity Arrangements, which is Chapter X in
Real Estate Bankruptcies and Workouts (A.B.A. SEC. OF REAL PROP., PROB, AND TR.
L. 1983), at 181.
270. See Lewis v. Chase, 23 Mass. App. Ct. 673, 505 N.E.2d 211 (1987), where
the optionor's obligations to deliver marketable title and to use best efforts to have the
deed delivered in accordance with that term were held to include an implied obligation
to eliminate the title defects involved.
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optionee the right to cancel the sales contract if the vendor is unable to
produce the quality of title promised.2 71 Absent a contrary agreement,
the cancelling optionee would not be entitled to recover the considera-
tion paid for- the option unless the optionor acted tortiously, because he
had received what he paid for, the option. The buyers may still elect to
enforce the option even if the sellers were unable to provide the title
promised .2 72
The discovery of a title defect which the seller asserts he cannot or
will not remedy may constitute an anticipatory repudiation of the con-
tract. Where the optionor gives notice of his inability or unwillingness
to perform prior to the option being exercised, the issue is whether he
has been released from his obligations by the failure of a condition or
has committed an anticipatory repudiation of the contract." 3 If he is
not released, then, in the words of the Restatement:
(1) Where an obligor repudiates a duty before he has committed a
breach by non-performance and before he has received all of the
agreed exchange for it, his repudiation alone gives rise to a claim
for damages for total breach.2 '
The optionor's anticipatory repudiation would relieve the optionee of
any further obligations. 27  Having received notice that the optionor
cannot or will not deliver as required by the option, the optionee is
relieved of any obligation to give notice of election to exercise the op-
tion or to tender performance as a prerequisite to a suit for damages
271. Normandy Beach Properties Corporation v. Adams, 107 Fla. 583, 145 So.
870 (1933).
272. See, e.g., in Baker v. Cox, 120 So. 2d 214 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1960).
273. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 253 comment a (1981). Such a
repudiation is sometimes elliptically called an 'anticipatory breach,' meaning a breach
by anticipatory repudiation because it occurs before there is any breach by non-
performance."
274. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 253 (1981). (Effect of a Repudi-
ation as a Breach and on Other Party's Duties). See also RESTATEMENT § 250, which
states: "When a Statement of an Act Is a Repudiation. A repudiation is (a) a state-
ment by the obligor to the obligee indicating that the obligor will commit a breach that
would of itself give the obligee a claim for damages for total breach under § 243, or (b)
a voluntary affirmative act which renders the obligor unable or apparently unable to
perform without such a breach."
275. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 253 (1981) states: "(2) Where
performances are to be exchanged under an exchange of promises, one party's repudia-
tion of a duty to render performance discharges the other party's remaining duties to
render performance."
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for breach of the option.276
The problem of protection from title defects may also arise in the
context of exercising a preemptive right. Where the preemptor takes
precautions to avoid obvious title problems, the third party whose offer
was preempted may claim the preemption was ineffective because it did
not match the preempted offer, for example, where the preemptor
sought and got an agreement to escrow funds to guaranty that the out-
standing mortgage was paid off. 277 That challenge was not upheld be-
cause the court concluded that such steps would have been required
regardless of who the ultimate purchaser was.
F. Waste
The possibility that an optionee in possession may harm the prop-
erty is really not an option issue. An optionee would not be in posses-
sion because of the option, but because a possessory right had been
granted in addition to the option. The typical example is the lease-op-
tion, where the optionee's possession is due to the lease. Ample reme-
dies are available to a landlord whose tenant is harming the leased
premises and the effect that exercising such remedy would have on the
tenant's rights under the option has been considered in the earlier dis-
cussion of lease-options. 78 Similarly, if the optionee were a licensee
with a contractual right to remain on the property, the optionor would
have ample remedies should the licensee/optionee breach the terms of
that contract.27 9
The interesting question is whether the optionee can prevent the
optionor in possession from changing the property or letting it deterio-
rate.280 The optionee does not fit the traditional class of parties who
276. Berman v. Max, 102 Fla. 1094,.137 So. 120 (Fla. 1931).
277. Reef v. Bernstein, 23 Mass. App. 599, 504 N.E.2d 374 (1987).
278. See supra § IV B.
279. See the discussion of the contractual nature of mortgagee's right to prevent
the mortgagor's waste in Camden Trust Co. v. Handle, 132 N.J. Eq. 97, 26 A.2d 865,
154 A.L.R. 602 (N.J. 1942). See also 3 POWELL ON REAL PROP. § 428 (revocability of
licenses) and § 453(2) (mortgagee's remedy against waste by the mortgagor) (1987).
280. Unless otherwise agreed, under an executory sales contract the purchaser
bears the risk of loss due to the doctrine of equitable conversion. Even where there is an
agreement that the seller will maintain the premises, the interpretation of that term
may lead to litigation. See, e.g., Utah State Medical Association v. Utah State Em-
ployees Credit Union, 655 P.2d 643 (Utah 1982), involving the standard by which the
maintenance of the building's air conditioning system should be measured.
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would be protected by the doctrine of waste. That class was limited to
future interest holders, although it has expanded to include the pur-
chaser under an executory contract. 81 An optionee has no interest in
the land. He merely has the right to accept an offer, and on acceptance
he would become a party to a contract to purchase. Only then would
equitable conversion vest an equitable estate in him which he could
protect from the malfeasance, misfeasance or even nonfeasance of the
legal owner. If he wants protection prior to that point, he must arrange
for that in the terms of the contract. Moreover, absent an agreement
binding the optionor to maintain the property in its then condition, al-
lowing the optionee to assert power over the land would seem to give
him more than that for which he bargained and paid. Conversely, to
allow the optionor to despoil the land would seem to condone an antici-
patory repudiation of the contract because the optionor will be unable
to convey the property as it was when the option was granted.
An example is provided by Walsh v. Powell,2 82 where the optionee
sought to enjoin the optionor from removing the topsoil during the five
year option. Although the court refers to the doctrine of waste and to
precedents under which the optionee has a substantial interest in the
land,288 it seems to have based its conclusion that an injunction is avail-
able on the purpose for which the option was obtained and the princi-
ples of equity. The optionee planned to develop the land for residential
purposes. The topsoil would be a necessity for that development and
the removal of topsoil would be an irreparable injury because equity
considers land to be unique. In addition, the question of whether the
optionor would be liable for the topsoil already removed under the doc-
trine of waste is left unanswered. 84
The case would be better analyzed, reaching the same conclusion,
as a question of the terms of the parties' agreement. Because the par-
ties intended that the optionee be able to purchase the land for develop-
ment purposes, they could not have intended to allow the optionor to
block the development and make the option worthless. That option
281. See, e.g., Asher v. Hull, 207 Okla. 478, 250 P.2d 866 (1952).
282. 76 Pa. D. & C. 108 (Pa., C.P. Del. County, 1951).
283. Id. at 112.
284. The opinion refers, id. at 112, to MCCLINTOCK, MCCLINTOCK ON EQUITY
299 (2d ed. 1948), which states that where the optionee has removed timber during the
term of the option, he will be held liable for waste if the option is subsequently exer-
cised. But see Note, The Vendor's Liability for Permissive Waste, 48 HARV. L. REV.
821, 825 (1935), indicating that there is a conflict in the few reported cases on the
subject.
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would be illusory. They must have intended to obligate the seller to
maintain the property in its then condition, at least to the extent that
the development plans would not be undermined. Consequently, the in-
junction should have been issued to prevent the optionor's anticipatory
breach of the contract because that would have caused irreparable
harm to the optionee. Accordingly, damages for topsoil already re-
moved would be determined according to contract principles where
there has been an anticipatory breach.2 85
In the absence of an express term, it is possible that courts may
find that the obligation of good faith has been implied. 86 Such an obli-
gation might require that the optionor maintain the property pending
the optionee's decision to exercise the option or not. However, the ex-
tent of the required maintenance and the degree to which the optionor
could change the use of the land during the pendency of the optionI
would have to be decided on a case by case basis according to the cir-
cumstances surrounding each option. That would be a less than ideal
solution for the parties because it would leave them in doubt as to
whether the option allows or prohibits certain conduct. However, if the
implied term is interpreted to be consistent with the Rule Against Re-
straints on Alienation discussed previously,287 it should lead to the rule
that the optionor cannot change the property, either actively or pas-
sively, so as to interfere with the purposes for which he knew or should
have known that the optionee obtained the option but such prohibition
shall not unreasonably interfere with the optionor's beneficial use of the
property prior to the option being exercised. What would be reasonable
would naturally be dependent in part on the duration of the option.
Where the parties need more specificity, they can obtain it by
agreeing to explicit terms. The paucity of reported litigation on this
subject, however, should not be taken as an indication that it is an un-
likely topic for dispute and that, consequently, there is no need for
more specific terms. More likely, it indicates that in the event a prob-
lem arises, the optionee's most efficient solution is to exercise the option
immediately, taking control of the property away from the optionor at
285. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 334-356 (1981); J.
CALAMARI AND J. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS ch. 14 (3d Ed. 1987).
286. See, e.g., the Uniform Commercial Code § 1-203 (1977), "Obligation of
Good Faith. Every contract or duty within this code imposes an obligation of good faith
in its performance or enforcement." This obligation governs contracts for the sale of
goods, commercial paper, documents of title, etc., and similar language is proposed for
real estate contracts in the Uniform Land Transactions Act § 1-301 (1977).
287. See Supra § V. B.
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the earliest possible time and making the optionor liable for any further
wasteful conduct after the option was exercised.
VI. Observations and Suggestions
The purchase option in its various forms is a very useful tool for
the real estate lawyer, developer, salesman, buyer and seller. It can per-
form a useful function in encouraging the commerce in, and develop-
ment of, real property. The major problems discovered in using options
arise from three sources. First, parties get into trouble by trying to
structure a transaction to appear to be an option when in reality it is
something else, such as a loan or a participation in a venture. 88 Op-
tions are not the only tool used to restructure a transaction, but it is
myopic to imagine that courts of equity or governmental agencies with
statutory mandates will not see through a transaction's appearance to
its substance. However, a professional may determine that it is worth
the risk involved in recharacterizing a transaction because of the poten-
tial gain. Such a calculated risk, if taken in good faith, may be justi-
fied. However, the cases seem to suggest that many parties have no
idea of the risks involved.
The second source of problems is the lack of awareness of the ap-
plicability to options of the Rule Against Perpetuities and the Rule
Against Restraints on Alienation. It appears that few lawyers or law
students ever learned that the Rule Against Perpetuities applies to op-
tions, although they may realize that options might be subject to the
Rule Against Restraints on Alienation. The difficulty of applying these
rules is legendary. Legislative attempts to simplify these rules, particu-
larly as they apply to purchase options, would provide, at least, a par-
tial solution. 89
The third, and greatest, source of problems is the failure of the
parties to appreciate that entering an option involves the parties in two
contracts, an option contract and a contract for the purchase of real
estate. Parties entering into a purchase contract ordinarily appreciate
the complexity of a transaction involving land. Form contracts for even
the simplest residential sale involve detailed provisions. They specify
288. The purpose may be to get favorable treatment, e.g., under the tax code, or
to avoid prohibitions, e.g., against usury or clogging the equity of redemption.
289. See, e.g., the UNIF. RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 8A U.L.A. CUMULATIVE
ANNUAL POCKET PART (1987), which was approved in 1986 by the National Confer-
ence of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.
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the basics, that is, the names of the parties, the date, the description of
the property and the purchase price. But they also include such impor-
tant terms as the quality of the title which the seller is required to
produce29°, whether the seller is required to demonstrate the quality of
his title,2 1 the method by which the seller is to demonstrate the quality
of his title,292 who is to bear the costs of such demonstration, what type
of deed the seller is to use to convey 2 93 how deposits are to be held,29
whether the purchase payment is to be escrowed until after the buyer's
deed is recorded, 95 whether the contract is conditioned upon the buyer
obtaining financing, ' 6 whether the contract is conditioned upon the re-
sults of any inspections,2 9 who has the right to possession during the
contract period, on whom will the risk of loss fall during the contract
period, whether hazard and liability insurance will be carried during
290. For example, is the title marketable? See supra § V. E.
291. Unless the contract specifies, it is generally the responsibility of the buyer to
determine the status of the title from the public records. However, in many jurisdic-
tions that is uncommon and would always be impracticable compared to the other
methods, e.g., using an abstract or title insurance may be impossible.
292. For example, a lawyer's opinion letter, an abstract or a title insurance pol-
icy covering the title.
293. For example, a general warranty deed, a special warranty deed, a statutory
warranty deed, or a quit claim deed?
294. For example, who is to hold the buyer's deposit and is it to be held in an
interest bearing account for the buyer's benefit?
295. The period between the buyer's last title search and the recording of the
buyer's deed is commonly referred to as the "gap." The buyer's concern is that an
adverse claim against the land will be recorded in the gap. Consequently, the buyer
may wish to verify that no title-clouding document was recorded in the gap prior to the
purchase price being released to the seller unless some other method is available to
protect him, e.g., title insurance covering the gap period, sometimes referred to as "gap
insurance."
296. The financing term may be provided for the protection of the buyer, the
seller or both. To illustrate, consider the following suggestions. To protect the seller, a
well drafted financing term should require that the buyer apply for the financing within
a specified time and obtain a written commitment for the financing within a specified
time. Failure to satisfy these conditions should give the seller the choice of whether to
terminate the contract and sell the property to another buyer, one who can raise the
purchase price. To protect the buyer, a well drafted financing term should specify that
if the buyer has made a good faith application for financing and cannot obtain the
written commitment at the terms specified to be acceptable, e.g., a mortgage for no less
than 25 years and at a fixed interest rate no higher than 11% and charging no more
than 3 discount points, then the buyer shall have the right to terminate the contract
and recover the deposit.
297. For example, structural, electrical, plumbing or termite inspections.
1987]
Nova Law Review
the executory period, who is responsible for obtaining it and who is
responsible for its cost, whether the contract is conditioned upon ob-
taining a satisfactory survey, 98 who is responsible for the payment of
any special assessment which may arise during the executory period,
whether the contract is conditioned on obtaining any changes in zoning
or conditioned on the zoning remaining unchanged, whether time is of
the essence in the performance of the contract and whether the rights
are transferrable.
However, even when receiving professional advice, parties fre-
quently fail to provide even for the essentials when using options. They
fail to specify the most important details of the option contract itself,
especially how long the option is to last and how the option is to be
exercised. They leave out almost every detail of the purchase contract
which was to arise when the option was exercised.
This regularity of such omissions has led the courts to develop the
body of law discussed above which controls the rights of the parties.
The courts have struggled to avoid holding options invalid for lack of
detail and to give meaning to the probable intent of the parties. How-
ever, parties are apparently surprised to discover that the details of
their agreements are provided by this growing body of precedents
rather than their own wishes. When the application of the precedents is
uncertain, they must litigate to solve their disagreements. It is clear
that the successful drafting of an option requires more foresight and
effort, not less, than the drafting of a sales contract because the option
must include the terms for two contracts, both the option contract and
the subsequent sales contract.
One approach which might protect the expectations of the parties
and eliminate a great deal of wasteful litigation over purchase options
would be to provide a statutory option which would provide any terms
not expressly agreed upon by the parties.2 99 It is more likely that real
estate professionals would be aware of the details of a statute and that
they would piece together the rules from a myriad of cases. However,
in many states the customs as to local terms vary from city to city and
298. The survey should show that no neighbors are encroaching onto the land
and none of the structures being sold are encroaching onto the land of neighbors, possi-
bly leading to unpleasant litigation. It should also show that the structures comply with
the requirements for locating structures in the covenants and zoning, e.g., setback
requirements.
299. Piecemeal legislation has in some states placed time limitations on otherwise
unlimited options, but that eliminates only a small part of the problem. See supra § V.
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county to county,300 so achieving statewide agreement on what should
be the terms would require a tremendous effort, and might prove im-
possible. It would also produce inflexibility by preventing the natural
development of the law as circumstances change. An alternative ap-
proach would be to provide certain gap fillers as is done by the Uni-
form Commercial Code for contracts for the sale of goods.301 The court
could then use such concepts as usage of trade,30 2 course of dealing s
or course of performance,304 but that simply adds questions of fact to
be proved rather than simplifying or clarifying the rights and obliga-
tions of the parties. State legislatures are unlikely to perceive that the
problems discovered in the use of purchase options would justify the
effort required for a legislative solution.
It is also unlikely that encouraging the courts to take a tougher
line on the minimum needed for a valid purchase option would make
the parties, or even real estate professionals, more diligent in working
out and memorializing the terms of their option contracts.30 5 In all like-
lihood, finding poorly drafted or oral options invalid would only result
in more optionees being deprived of the benefit of the bargain for which
300. For example, in a recent survey conducted by the author requesting the
contracts of sale used by the local boards of Realtors in Florida, eight different con-
tracts were received from local boards in addition to the one produced and regularly
updated by The Florida Bar and The Florida Association of Realtors acting in concert.
301. However, it should be noted that the major proposal to modify real estate
contract law in the mode of the U.C.C. has met with an overwhelming lack of accept-
ance. As of 1987, no state had yet adopted the U.L.T.A. See UNIFORM LAND TRANS-
ACTIONS ACT, 13 U.L.A. 469 (1977).
302. See U.C.C. § 1-205(2) which defines usage of trade as: "Any practice or
method of dealing having such regularity of observance in a place, vocation or trade as
to justify an expectation that it will be observed with respect to the transaction in
question."
303. U.C.C. § 1-205(1) defines course of dealing as "a sequence of previous con-
duct between the parties to a particular transaction which is fairly to be regarded as
establishing a common basis of understanding for interpreting their expressions and
other conduct."
304. U.C.C. § 2-208(1) states that:
[W]here the contract for sale involves repeated occasions for performance
by either party with knowledge of the nature of the performance and op-
portunity for objection to it by the other, any course of performance ac-
cepted or acquiesced in without objection shall be relevant to determine
the meaning of the agreement.
305. Although, it does seem appropriate to encourage courts to require a
purchase option to satisfy the same writing requirements as any other contract affect-
ing real estate, absent express statutory language to the contrary.
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they paid, a result which the courts have struggled to avoid. Only a
prospective change would be effective anyway. It would probably take
decades before the general populace learned from these precedents that
options needed a greater degree of detail. The very nature of the option
is to allow delay in decision making until some future point so drafting
mistakes made before the change in policy would either be caught in
the change without a chance to comply, a useful example but one
which courts are unlikely to provide, or would be excused, effectively
undermining the change.
The probable reason for the last two problem sources also leads to
a possible solution. Lawyers and real estate professionals seem to be
unaware of the applicability of the rules and of the two contract struc-
ture of options because those points are not made, at least not made
effectively, in their educations. Options do not seem to get much treat-
ment, if any, in the law school property curriculum 6 or in real estate
brokers' licensing courses.8 07 Law students easily could and should have
306. In examining the books used in first year property courses in law schools in
the United States, all of the following have extensive sections on the real estate sale
transaction but none have a section on options or even mention options in the table of
contents or the index: 0. BROWDER, R. CUNNINGHAM AND A. SMITH, BASIC PROPERTY
LAW (4th ed. 1984); J. BRUCE, J. ELY AND C. BOSTICK, MODERN PROPERTY LAW
(1984); A. CASNER AND W. LEACH, CASES AND TEXT ON PROPERTY (3d ed. 1984); J.
CRIBBET AND C. JOHNSON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON PROPERTY (5th ed. 1984) (al-
though it does introduce the section with an option case, at 1137); and J. KURTZ AND
H. HOVENKAMP, AMERICAN PROPERTY LAW (1987). However, C. HAAR AND L. LIEB-
MAN, PROPERTY AND LAW (2d ed. 1985) does show the application of the Rule Against
Perpetuities to options, at 626-631, as does J. DUKEMINIER AND J. KRIER, PROPERTY
(1981) 479-483. Of the texts used to teach advanced real property courses, neither N.
PENNY, R. BROUDE AND R. CUNNINGHAM, LAND FINANCING (3d ed. 1985) nor P.
GOLDSTEIN, REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS (1980) contains any mention of options in
the table of contents or the index; and A. AXELROD, C. BERGER AND Q. JOHNSTONE,
LAND TRANSFER AND FINANCE (2d ed. 1978) mentions options only in notes (one on
404 regarding the use of straws, another on 408 regarding specific performance, and
the third on 425 regarding risk of loss) according to the index. G. NELSON AND D.
WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE TRANSFER, FINANCE, AND DEVELOPMENT (3d ed. 1987) pro-
vides a very brief introduction to options, at 887-891, and a discussion of an option
possibly being a clog on the equity of redemption, at 259-262, but it also includes
references to options in some of the notes and commentary, e.g., the discussion of con-
ditions in contracts on page 107. Texts used to supplement the classroom provide no
greater coverage. G. NELSON AND D. WHITMAN, REAL -ESTATE FINANCE LAW (2d ed.
1985) only discusses purchase options to the extent that they may be determined to
clog the equity of redemption, § 3.2 and purchase options are not included in J. BRUCE,
REAL ESTATE FINANCE IN A NUTSHELL (2d ed. 1985).
307. For example, G. GAINES AND 0. COLEMAN, FLORIDA REAL ESTATE PRINCI-
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an introduction to options as part of the section on real estate contracts
in their basic property course when most books introduce everything
included in the purchase contract. Requiring real estate brokers to
learn more about the basics of options as part of their licensing require-
ment would also seem to be an easily accomplished improvement.
The message could reach practicing lawyers and brokers through
the continuing education courses offered to the respective professions.
In addition, Real Estate Boards and local bar associations could pro-
vide their members with sample standardized forms for purchase op-
tions as they do for sales contracts.30 8 The forms could easily be drafted
to incorporate by reference the terms of the local real estate
contract." 9
In the final analysis, the rules and theories governing purchase op-
tions are not that difficult. The application of those rules to the compli-
cated situation of a possible real estate sale requires that the parties
actually take the effort to agree fully to the terms, that they consider
foreseeable future events, that they understand the ramifications of
their agreements, that they understand the limits which the law may
place on their agreements, and that they understand that absent ex-
press agreement on a point, the case law will provide the details for
their agreement, details which they may not like.
PLES, PRACTICES & LAW (3d ed. 1979) options receive a little more than one page of
coverage. In the accompanying Pre-exam Review Outline (2d ed. 1979), options are
outlined in one half of a page.
308. The survey of the Boards of Realtors in Florida conducted by the author,
and referred to above at note 300, did not reveal a single option form.
309. See the suggested forms provided in I FLORIDA REAL ESTATE TRANSAC-
TIONS, Ch. 6B.
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